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The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Strengthening of the United Nations system capacity for conflict prevention" (JIU/REP/95/13).

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Annex

STRENGTHENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM CAPACITY FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

Prepared by

H. L. Hernandez
S. Kuyama

Joint Inspection Unit

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Acronyms

ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CDR	Centre for Documentation on Refugees
CSA	Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
CSBM	Confidence and Security-building measures
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAM	Department of Administration and Management
DDSMS	Department for Development Support and Management Services
DESIPA	Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPCSD	Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development
DPKO	Department of Peace-keeping operations
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States' Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GNP	Gross National Product
HCHR/CHR	High Commissioner for Human Rights/Centre for Human Rights
IA	International Alert
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IGADD	Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JCGP	Joint Consultative Group on Policy
LAS	League of Arab States
MINUGUA	United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSAL	United Nations Mission in El Salvador
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPT	Non-proliferation Treaty
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODIHR	Warsaw Office for Democratic Institution on Human Rights
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
ONUMOZ	United Nations Organization for Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
ORCI	Office of Research and Collection of Information
OSCE	Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe
PARINAC	Partnership in Action
PCPB	post-conflict peace-building
PIOOM	Centre for the Study of Social Conflicts, Leiden University
PRODERE	Development Programme for Displaced Persons Refugees & Returnees in Central America

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PUCIS	Policy Advice Unit on the CIS and the Baltic States (UNHCR)
RBE	Regional Bureau for Europe (UNHCR)
SADC	Southern African Development Commission
SELA	Sistema Economico Latinoamericano
SIPRI	Stockholm International Research Institute
SWANAME	Regional Bureau for South West Asia, North Africa and the Middle East (UNHCR)
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIC	United Nations Information Centre
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations for Somalia
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Programme
WWW	World Wide Web

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There were some 50 serious on-going and emerging conflicts worldwide in 1993-94. About 26.8 million refugees are created by these conflicts and they involved roughly 4 million deaths. This tremendous loss of life is continuing, and civilians make up as much as 90 per cent of the casualties. The high potential for escalation of current low-intensity conflicts into more serious conflicts and outright wars implies that the international community will unavoidably be involved in an increasing number of them.

No nation, however secure militarily or economically, can consider itself immune from destabilizing conditions elsewhere in the world. There is today no one country or group of countries ready and able to cope with new world disorder alone[1]. The United Nations, despite much criticism, remains the pre-eminent international authority for dealing with threats to international security and internal crises.

Recent experience has nevertheless shown that, to be effective and efficient, the United Nations must become more **pro-active** in dealing with conflicts, and must develop and use new tools, new concepts and new responses. An emerging consensus calls for much more emphasis on conflict prevention. This implies, in particular, more extensive use of preventive diplomacy and more active involvement, in preventive (pre-conflict) peace-building. These activities, in fact, may constitute the core of a **comprehensive conflict prevention** strategy.

The basic objective of implementing comprehensive prevention is to build conflict-resistant conditions in potentially vulnerable countries or regions. The United Nations system is uniquely qualified to launch such a concept, for almost all of its organizations have at their disposal diverse operational units able to deal with various factors which are the sources of conflict. Only the United Nations offers an integrated approach based on its global network, matchless experience and universal legitimacy[2]. Thus, it is uniquely positioned to help countries to reconcile the joint objectives of peace and development.

In practice, however, the potential of the United Nations to carry out an integrated approach has not yet been fully developed, either within the United Nations itself or with the specialized agencies. In the Inspectors' view a number of immediate measures need to be taken in order to establish and implement comprehensive conflict prevention strategy.

Preventive diplomacy should take a much more prominent place in the activities of the United Nations system. In fact, the importance of strengthening preventive diplomacy was one of the two major topics addressed in the course of the general debate at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly in September-October 1995[3]. In this connection, Member States advocate in particular more active involvement and more efficient use of the expertise and potential of the main organs of the United Nations in the area of conflict prevention, including establishing a systematic link and cooperation between them. Some measures to attain this objective are suggested below.

RECOMMENDATION 1. Within the context of strengthening the functions of the main organs of the United Nations in conflict prevention, the General Assembly may wish to consider such ideas as:

(a) identifying practical ways and means of involving the General Assembly in preventive diplomacy;

(b) instituting regular meetings of the Security Council to review conflict-prone situations;

(c) determining how ECOSOC might contribute to better anticipation of economic and social problems likely to result in a crisis, and develop strategies to deal with economic and social causes of conflicts;

(d) creating an ad hoc Working Group or a small committee on conflict prevention, composed of members of the Security Council and ECOSOC in order to facilitate handling of potential crises in a comprehensive manner; and

(e) using the International Court of Justice in the peaceful settlements of disputes, including the so-called "chambers" jurisdiction or informal mediation by the Court.

The Inspectors consider that a more professional and focused approach to conflict prevention is required. The capacity of the Secretariat to support the preventive diplomacy functions of the competent legislative bodies and the Secretary-General needs to be strengthened. Currently only **0.65** per cent of the United Nations regular budget is allocated to preventive diplomacy (together with peace making). Effective preventive diplomacy can avoid peace-keeping, post-conflict peace-building, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction, all of which are far more costly endeavours. In addition, such preventive diplomacy can help avoid unnecessary loss of human lives.

RECOMMENDATION 2. Member States may wish to consider attaching a higher priority to preventive diplomacy and allocating increased resources to this function, inter alia, through shifting resources from low-priority areas.

The present Secretariat set-up appears to provide not sufficient focus on preventive diplomacy. The relevant functions are distributed over regional divisions in the Department for Political Affairs (DPA). Some of them are also being performed by the Department of Peace-keeping operations (DPKO).

RECOMMENDATION 3. To provide for a more sharpened focus on preventive diplomacy, and more effective fulfilment by DPA of the relevant tasks, and subject to the increase in the Department's resources as suggested in Recommendation 2 above, the Secretary-General may wish to undertake the necessary structural refinement of the Department, including, as an option, the setting-up of a specific conflict prevention unit, as appropriate. Major functions of DPA thus strengthened in the area of preventive diplomacy would be:

(a) carrying out an action-oriented analysis of situations which could possibly degrade into conflict, by consolidating internal and external information;

(b) proposing to the Secretary-General appropriate actions with a streamlined channel of communications (access) to facilitate early action;

(c) assisting the Secretary-General in carrying out preventive diplomacy actions (such as fact-finding, mediation and good offices missions) decided by him and/or mandated by the Security Council;

(d) providing secretariat services to the Security Council on preventive diplomacy issues; and

(e) serving as a "core" for small field missions, if and when necessary.

RECOMMENDATION 4. As a supplement to the measures to be taken at headquarters levels, the Secretary-General may wish to consider setting up, when necessary and feasible, in the United Nations regional centres (venues of the regional commissions), small preventive diplomacy teams. These teams would assess the evolution of situations that could possibly degrade into conflicts and recommend appropriate measures to/or through DPA. As necessary and in accordance with instructions of the United Nations Headquarters, they would undertake appropriate actions, including establishing links with respective governments, parties, factions and groups involved in order to defuse or head-off conflicts. The teams should be assisted by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (political issues), and United Nations Resident Coordinators serving in countries of the respective regions (economic, social and humanitarian issues) as well as by the regional commissions and other United Nations offices as appropriate.

Efficient early warning capacity, to a considerable degree, determines the success of preventive diplomacy actions. At present, some United Nations departments and System organizations already have a substantial amount of information and possess various types of this capacity. For instance, the United Nations proper has at its disposal several early warning or similar mechanisms. There is also an inter-agency capacity, as well as a "Framework for coordination" (among DHA, DPA and DPKO) which includes an element for joint analysis of early warning signals. In the Inspectors' view, independent analyses/early warnings, no matter how useful they are to serve their own purposes, do not facilitate concerted and effective preventive actions of the United Nations system on the basis of a common understanding of the problems. In this sense, the "Framework for coordination" can be regarded as a positive step towards better coordination among the departments concerned. In reality, however, this mechanism appears to have some weaknesses, in particular in the area of coordination between the Headquarters, offices away from New York (including HCHR/CHR) and the field. It also needs to be added that a most useful existing early warning system - the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) - is only an extra-budgetary project financed by one Member State.

In order to create an efficient early warning capacity within the United Nations system, a number of measures need to be taken to improve information collection (reporting) procedures, strengthen the analytical capabilities of various departments, offices and organizations of the System, and consolidate these into one systematic and comprehensive capacity and mechanism.

RECOMMENDATION 5. The humanitarian early warning system of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs ("HEWS") may constitute the core of a consolidated United Nations early warning capacity, which should be placed by the Secretary-General in DPA to serve as an "analytical support and assessment system" of the preventive diplomacy activities described in Recommendation 3. [It is understood that "HEWS" in new location can also function for humanitarian early warning purposes, to which reference is made in a new JIU report on the involvement of the United Nations system in providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance[4]]. After relocation of "HEWS" to DPA, the possibility of financing the system from the regular budget should be considered, having in mind Recommendation 2.

RECOMMENDATION 6. The Secretary-General should ensure that reporting to the Headquarters on the country situation (potential/imminent problems) by the field offices of the United Nations operational agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, etc.) as well as by UNICs and the field missions of United Nations departments/offices (DPA, DHA, DPKO, HCHR/CHR) is regularized and the relevant information and analysis is channelled systematically to DPA. In this connection, availability of on-line computer facilities with compatible hardware and software as well as a standardized format of reporting would expedite necessary processing. Furthermore, it is important to have close coordination and cooperation among departments/agencies and to come up with preliminary field level judgements on situations in a given spot, through continuous monitoring.

RECOMMENDATION 7. Member States, United Nations specialized agencies, regional organizations, NGOs and other sources such as academic and research institutions should also be invited to provide relevant information and analysis to DPA.

The Inspectors are aware of the fact that some Member States have certain reservations about setting up a full-fledged early warning capacity in the United Nations Secretariat. These, in the Inspectors' view, may be overcome by ensuring **transparency** of the System, without jeopardizing confidentiality, as provided for in General Assembly resolution 47/120. The Inspectors also believe that it is desirable to have a feedback mechanism to facilitate sharing information to ensure better coordination for concerted action.

The Inspectors wish to emphasize that early warning is not an objective itself, but a management tool for conflict prevention. The experience of the recent involvement of the United Nations in conflict situations clearly indicates that the one of the major problems in this area is to ensure **transition from early warning to early action**.

Comprehensive conflict prevention should include, as an indispensable element, **preventive (pre-conflict) peace-building**. At present, some of the United Nations system organizations and programmes carry out activities which may be qualified as addressing root causes of conflicts. For example, the UNDP Executive Board has earmarked five per cent of core resources (approximately US$ 50 million annually) for preventive and curative activities in "countries in special situations". Although this is a positive step, a comprehensive strategy of conflict prevention requires much more emphasis on preventive (pre-conflict) peace-building.

RECOMMENDATION 8. The notion of preventive (pre-conflict) peace-building/"preventive development" must be clearly and fully integrated/incorporated into the substantive as well as operational programmes of the United Nations system as a complement to preventive diplomacy. In this context, the organizations of the United Nations system, individually and collectively, should review existing policies, programmes, and programming processes, and sharpen the focus on alleviating root causes of conflicts. Special attention should be paid to building indigenous capacity (including the capacity of women and youth) for problem-solving/conflict prevention through enhancement of training programmes in these areas. This could include not only establishment of training/conflict resolution centres at the national and local levels to provide training grounds, but also development of conflict prevention mechanisms by launching, for example, a global pilot project on conflict prevention by drawing a wide participation of women and youth in the peace agenda. Furthermore, within the context of capacity building, specific sectors should be targeted, which would include judicial and legal structures, institutions and instruments aimed at the protection of minorities and minority cultures, and public service broadcasting.

RECOMMENDATION 9. The governing bodies of the United Nations system, particularly those of development agencies, may wish to consider strengthening their respective organizations' programmes and activities addressing root causes of conflicts, thus enhancing the role of these organizations in conflict prevention.

RECOMMENDATION 10. Inventories, case studies, and evaluation reports on conflict prevention policies, programmes and projects should be prepared, and lessons/success stories be synthesized and disseminated, as appropriate and upon request, to programme countries, donor agencies, United Nations system organizations, regional organizations, financial institutions, NGOs, parliamentary groups, academic institutions for effective utilization and feedback.

RECOMMENDATION 11. In order to enhance United Nations system activities addressing root causes of conflicts, the United Nations and specialized agencies should more extensively use the United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) and experienced national officers.

The coordination of activities related to conflict prevention is of special relevance. Appropriate mechanisms of coordination should be reinforced both at the field and at the headquarters levels, to ensure concerted actions of the United Nations system organizations in the area of preventive diplomacy and pre-conflict peace building.

RECOMMENDATION 12. The Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), should initiate and take the lead of inter-agency discussions on the subject of conflict prevention, to enhance and promote the relevant activities of the United Nations system and coordination thereof.

RECOMMENDATION 13. At the field level, existing programming procedures such as the "Country Strategy Note" could be actively utilized both as a mechanism to identify critical problems, including the degree of a country's vulnerability to potential crisis on a medium to long-term perspective, and as a frame of reference for system-wide coordination and cooperation in addressing problems identified.

RECOMMENDATION 14. Closer collaboration between development agencies and humanitarian as well as human rights agencies should be ensured both at the field and at the headquarters level, in order to coordinate activities (programmes) and to optimize the use of the resources available to them.

Needless to say, the challenge which the international community is facing today is too overwhelming to be coped with by the United Nations alone. **Universal cooperation** is indispensable, which implies **joint efforts** of Member States, the United Nations system, multilateral financial institutions, regional organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations and research institutions, with each of them playing a new and specific role based on their comparative advantages. However, the United Nations should be both the catalyst and the center of this cooperation, because of its mandate and as the only organization having the capacity to integrate political, humanitarian, military and socio-economic activities related to peace and development.

RECOMMENDATION 15. To enhance concerted action of the global community - which is an essential requirement to ensure effectiveness of preventive efforts at the international, regional, national and local levels - the United Nations should act as a centre and catalyst of joint efforts, to cultivate an effective division of labour between all the actors involved (specialized agencies, regional organizations, national institutions, NGOs, as well as parliamentary groups, academic institutions, etc.) taking into account their knowledge, experiences, potentiality, and comparative advantages.

Above all, the ability of the United Nations to cope with this challenge hinges on the resolve of its Member States to give the Organization the **indispensable political, moral and material support** it requires.

In the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the Organization's founding, the newly rekindled hope that the United Nations can be the guarantor of peaceful development, human rights, and stability is on the verge of being dashed once again. The Organization is functioning in an environment which may be characterized by "conflict fatigue", and "donor fatigue", as it goes through the worst financial crisis in its history. As recently pointed out by the Secretary-General, "the United Nations faces imminent crisis and along with it the risk of collapse of the entire structure of peace that (we have been building) for half a century".[5] This should not be allowed to happen. The world needs a strong and effective United Nations. In the Declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, the Member States and observers of the United Nations, inter alia, committed themselves to "give to the twenty-first century a United Nations equipped, financed and structured to serve effectively the peoples in whose name it was established".[6]

At a time when Member States have been called upon not only to reform but also to reinvent the United Nations to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, the idea of strengthening the Organization's capacity for conflict prevention through enhancing its preventive diplomacy and pre-conflict peace-building, may be a central issue. Indeed, its implementation would allow the Organization to: (a) direct its limited resources to the world's highest priority; (b) concentrate on fewer tasks and the comparative advantage resulting from its universal mandate for maintaining international peace and security, and combine expertise in political, economic, social and humanitarian fields; (c) consolidate programmes and agencies with overlapping functions; and (d) become, as a result, a more effective and useful instrument.

INTRODUCTION

1. The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations is not only an occasion to recognize its achievements. It is also an opportunity which calls for serious reflection and analysis on the future role of the Organization. Five decades after its birth, the United Nations is faced with a vastly changed international environment.

2. In the last several years, the activities of the United Nations have changed dramatically, particularly because of an exponential growth in peace-keeping operations (PKOS). In 1988, the United Nations was involved in 5 disputes or confrontations. In 1994, their number reached 27. More than 70,000 United Nations military and civilian personnel were serving in the relevant peace-keeping and related missions. The United Nations annual budget for peace-keeping in 1994 rose sharply to US$3,6 billion and remained at about the same level in 1995[7]. The demand for this United Nations activity, the number of personnel, the budgets involved - all are of vastly greater magnitude than in the past. This increased activity has strained the Organization because of both quantitative and qualitative changes. The latter have been even more significant than the former.

3. Today's operations are considerably more complex and demanding. Some of the activities now undertaken include supervising democratic elections, monitoring human rights, overseeing the repatriation of refugees, disarming opposing factions, reconstructing war-damaged infrastructures, and providing humanitarian assistance. Whereas PKOs used to come about after protracted negotiations with recognized and legitimate actors, this is no longer always the case. In recent years, conflicts and confrontations within State borders have become more prevalent than wars between States. Sometimes there are no easily-recognizable actors with whom to carry out talks. The deployment of peace-keeping troops and civilian personnel in a hostile environment is another recent development.

4. Given the lack of preparation for the dramatic increase in PKOs, their transformed nature, and the difficult circumstances in which they have often been carried out, there have been both successes and failures. The latter, though, in much greater degree is attributable to parties involved in conflicts than to the inefficiency of the Organization. But unjustifiably, it is the Organization which is criticized most. However, the experience of Rwanda, for instance, and especially that of the former Yugoslavia and Somalia has provoked an intensive international debate on how to deal with an increasing number of conflicts. In the United Nations, it has, in particular, revealed differences among Member States on the modus operandi for such conflicts.

5. Quite a number of Member States increasingly advocate the return to the traditional format of peace-keeping and to the customary caution with which such operations were established, while some others support the present approaches.

6. This debate, in addition, highlighted differences regarding United Nations priorities for action. Many countries, explicitly or implicitly, want to devote continuing attention and resources to peace-keeping activities, while many others, especially from the developing world, would rather focus more on economic and social development programmes. An important result emerged from this debate, however: a greater recognition of the necessity to place much more emphasis on conflict prevention.

7. Prevention is the most effective and cost-efficient way of dealing with conflicts. Experience has shown that the cost of passivity, of not interfering with conflicts in a preventive manner is millions of lost lives during the conflicts and billions of United States dollars spent on reconstruction of devastated countries. The question inevitably arises whether the international community can afford it for long. The answer is definitely "no".

8. The present report is intended to contribute to the search for ways to enhance the capacity of the United Nations system for conflict prevention. Its main objective is to advance a comprehensive conflict prevention concept. The Inspectors present the rationale for this concept, its content, and modalities of implementation. It is generally understood that "conflict prevention" has two aspects: first, efforts to prevent the emergence of a situation likely to give rise to large-scale human suffering, and, second, efforts to prevent further deterioration of such a situation once it has arisen. However, for the purposes of the present report, the Inspectors focused on conflict prevention measures in pre-conflict situations.

9. The Inspectors hope that their ideas may prove to be useful not only to the United Nations system but also to regional, subregional and non-governmental organizations, as well as to donor and recipient countries.

I. DEALING WITH CURRENT CONFLICTS: ACTIONS AND PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

A. Current conflicts: major characteristics and consequences

10. The Centre for the Study of Social Conflicts (PIOOM), Leiden University, in its survey for 1992, enumerated 160 violent and potentially violent domestic and international conflicts. Among these, 32 were classified as "outright wars", in which there were at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, another 69 as low intensity conflicts "in which the violence is more sporadic and less intense", and 59 as serious disputes "in which one of the parties has threatened the use of violence or has deployed military troops or made a show of force".[8]

11. Most of today's conflicts are internal, rather than inter-state, with no clear-cut battle lines. According to the UNDP's Human Development Report 1994, only three of the 82 armed conflicts in the 1989-1992 period were between states.[9]

12. The consequences of the current conflicts have been profound. More than 4 million deaths are attributed to the recent conflicts with civilians making up as much as 90 per cent of casualties[10]. It was reported recently that 20 million people were at risk of starvation in nine African countries, including more than 6 million in war-torn Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda.[11]

13. Some countries have had not only collapsed economies and dislocated structures and systems, but also virtual destruction of productive assets and physical infrastructure. Angola, Liberia, and Somalia provide the most telling examples in this regard. Mozambique, for example, was less devastated, and hopefully a lasting peace has now been agreed, but a fifth of the health care facilities and over a third of the primary schools will have to be rebuilt completely.

14. Internal conflicts have created the greatest forced movements of people since the end of World War II. Today there are almost 20 million refugees worldwide, with an additional 24 million internally displaced, as compared to 8 million 10 years ago. These figures equal roughly one displaced person out of every 130, and 70-80 per cent of them are women and children.[12] It has been estimated that this total could rise to as many as 100 million people by the year 2000.

15. The current conflicts lead to gross abuses of human rights and humanitarian law. In many instances, the suffering endured by civilians is not an accidental element of political and military strategies but constitutes its major objective.[13] In addition to physical abuse and deprivation, the victims are often severely traumatized, and rape and sexual abuse occur more frequently. In some cases, as in Rwanda, the intra-state conflicts were accompanied by genocide.

16. Conflict and wars claim resources that would otherwise be spent on education and health and housing and other areas of development. Even some of the poorest countries spend more on their military budget than on their people's education and health.[14] In one African country, the military budget was five times that of health and education.

17. The intra-state conflicts have seriously affected both the volume and content of three types of United Nations activities, i.e., peace-keeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict peace-building. Preventive diplomacy has also become more active, although in a much lesser degree.

B. Peace-keeping: from exponential growth to downward trend?

18. Peace-keeping is only one of the range of means employed by the Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security. However this function has become the most prominent in the United Nations activities, for the reasons discussed above. It has also undergone notable conceptual and practical changes. Peace-keeping has increasingly moved beyond its traditional functions of monitoring, observing, reporting and supervising cease-fires. Currently, as pointed out by the Secretary-General in his "Position paper on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations", they have developed into integrated, multifunctional operations. They verify peace agreements and cease-fires and may have the power of enforcement. Often military components monitor disarmament and demobilization while supporting other components responsible for political development and reconciliation. Civil administration, including the monitoring of elections and referenda, human rights observance and police support, cooperation with field services, humanitarian expertise, political negotiation and mediation, or combination thereof, now frequently form standard elements of international peace-keeping.

19. Peace-keeping has put tremendous pressure on the financial and human resources of the United Nations. As acknowledged by the Secretary-General, it has also distorted the image of the United Nations.

20. As shown in para 2 above United Nations peace-keeping operations reached the peak in 1994. In the beginning of 1995, the trend has been somewhat downward, which was reversed later in the year. The reversal of the trend might be attributed to the operations in the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, while the number of peace-keeping operations decreased to 16, the number of peace-keepers went down only to 67,000. Therefore, the 1995 peace-keeping budget is likely to remain at about the same level as in 1994, i.e. US$ 3 billion[15]. The United Nations peace-keeping operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia are considered as the most costly. At the height of the operation in Somalia, peace-keeping costs were nearly US$ 3 million a day, while, at present, the daily cost of the operation in the former Yugoslavia is about US$ 5 million.

21. As peace-keeping operations are increasingly launched because of conflicts within states, they become inherently more complex and perilous. The number of casualties among peace-keepers has increased from an average of one per two weeks during the period preceding the Gulf war, to one every two days at present. Since 1948 there have been about 1,170 casualties among peace-keepers, of which about 725, or more than sixty per cent, occurred in the United Nations peace-keeping operations which are currently taking place[16]. In conflict within states, the United Nations has to deal with the multitude of actors of often ill-defined status and with unclear authority and command over the armed elements in the field. El Salvador, Cambodia, Rwanda, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina - in all these cases, the United Nations was called upon to deploy troops in order to contribute to the termination of an internal conflict or civil war.

22. Recently, a number of factors have begun to effect peace-keeping. The first is "conflict fatigue" which in turn, may be attributed to the outcomes of some United Nations missions. In fact, the 21 peace-keeping operations launched by the United Nations since 1988 have been a mixture of success, accomplishment, diluted by frustration and tragedy.[17]The failure of the United Nations peace-keeping mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to build a new state in that war-ravaged country is often viewed as a critical lesson about the problems associated with the international community's attempts to resolve the current conflicts. The widely publicized killings of peace-keeping troops by Somalia military men hardened attitudes among policymakers and the public about the efficacy and costs of military intervention as well as the limitations of United Nations peace-keeping. Operations in the former Yugoslavia have also invoked serious criticism with regard to United Nations peace-keeping.

23. Another factor has been the inability to deploy forces quickly when a crisis is emerging. This applies to United Nations peace operations, whether they be peace-keeping or related operations under Chapter VI or peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. For example, it took the United Nations more than six months to deploy UNTAC after it had been approved by the Security Council. The reactions to the Rwanda crisis were also very slow. In this context, it is worth mentioning that, at present, several proposals are being discussed, which aim at expediting deployment of United Nations peace missions. These proposals include a "United Nations fire brigade" and "Towards a Rapid Reaction capability for the United Nations".[18]

24. However, in assessing the United Nations performance in peace-keeping, attention is mostly being paid to the experience of the 1990s which have had both relative failures (Somalia, Bosnia, Angola) and successes (Cyprus, El Salvador, Haiti, Namibia, Cambodia, Georgia and Mozambique). The Organization certainly deserves credit for having been able, within the short span of time, to cope with the phenomenal increase in the number and volume of crises which occurred. On the other hand, the United Nations does not always offer the perfect response to conflicts, but neither does NATO, nor does unilateral action, nor does inaction. The Inspectors share the view that "the right cure for the ills of United Nations peace-keeping is to work to make this tool as useful and efficient as possible."[19] Despite criticism, United Nations peace-keeping operations have generally been more successful than might have been expected. For all their limitations, they have proved their ability, in the right circumstances, to separate adversaries, maintain ceasefires, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief, enable refugees and displaced persons to return home, demobilize combatants and create conditions under which political reconciliation may occur and free elections be held.[20]

25. No other issue has so dominated the United Nations in the past years as determining the proper role and effectiveness of its peace-keeping operations. Many tough questions have been asked in the Security Council and elsewhere about the objectives, cost, scope, mandate, risk and duration of peace-keeping missions. On many occasions, Member States emphasized that peace-keeping operations must have clear and realistic objectives, they must be properly equipped, money must not be wasted, and a completion date be identified. The result of this analytical process has been fewer and smaller new operations, and better management of the existing ones.

26. While the United Nations has began to rethink ground rules for peace-keeping, it has enhanced its operational effectiveness. Over the past two years, the Headquarters staff has been strengthened, a 24-hour Situation Center, a Training Unit, a Policy and Analysis Unit have been established, and a forward logistical base and storage depot have been set up.

C. Humanitarian assistance

27. The growing number of crises which erupt into violent conflicts have brought about a phenomenal increase of people in need of humanitarian assistance. Between 1989 and 1994, annual resources expended for humanitarian programmes of the United Nations system agencies more than tripled from US$845 million to some US$3 billion.[21] In 1995, humanitarian agencies will most probably spend over US$4 billion to respond to emergency situations.

28. As emergency and conflict situations continue to afflict the developing world, developed countries have responded by financing a growing volume of bilateral humanitarian aid out of shrinking aid budgets. Taking this aid to comprise emergency assistance and disaster relief, and, separately, food aid relief and expenditure on refugees, total humanitarian aid provided bilaterally by DAC members, shot up from $1 billion in the mid-1980s to $2,8 billion in 1991. In 1993 it amounted to $3.6 billion, or 11 per cent of bilateral official development assistance (ODA), in comparison with only three per cent in the 1980s. Almost 40 per cent of ODA channelled through the United Nations system is estimated to be targeted for humanitarian emergencies. Emergency assistance increased from 20 per cent in 1990 to 25 per cent in 1994 in terms of expenditure in operational activities, the main increase occurring in Africa.

29. Accordingly, the role and the structure of United Nations interventions in emergencies have altered substantially. As illustration of United Nations Humanitarian Operations, it may be mentioned that within the framework of ONUMOZ repatriation of 1.5 million of refugees from six neighbouring countries to Mozambique was involved. The main United Nations agencies concerned with relief operations - UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP - have expanded their share of total United Nations disbursements over the past several years. Moreover, the share of individual agency budgets devoted to relief activities has also risen. In WFP, for example, 25-40 per cent of assistance went to relief activities in each of the years 1984-89, but rose substantially from 1990 onwards. It was over 60 per cent in both 1992 and 1993, and reached 70 per cent in 1994.[22]

30. With regard to the current conditions of delivering humanitarian assistance, humanitarian agencies are compelled to operate in war-torn societies in an increasing number of cases. The Somalia experience highlighted both the difficulties of providing humanitarian action in the midst of total anarchy, as well as the limits of humanitarian action when recourse was made to peace-enforcement (Chapter VII of the Charter). The use of force against one party inevitably affects the perceived impartiality and neutrality of the United Nations, and by implication also of United Nations humanitarian organizations associated with the operation.

31. Disregard for humanitarian norms has major implications for the overall impact and effectiveness of humanitarian action and the well-being of those it is intended to support. The former Yugoslavia is but one example of the way in which humanitarian activity is restricted and supplies are diverted and abused to achieve objectives that are diametrically opposed to humanitarian objectives. In other conflict settings such as Liberia, access to humanitarian assistance as an urgent and inalienable right has been disrupted and denied for the expressed purpose of achieving political objectives.

32. The limited means of humanitarian agencies to provide protection is particularly glaring in conflict settings and in situations characterized by gross violations of human rights. The Rwandan experience illustrates how the capacity of the United Nations to provide protection and assistance is undermined when inputs and distribution mechanisms are used for purposes inimical to humanitarian objectives. Finding a means of reaching those in need without entrenching the power of abusive elements is one of the most difficult challenges facing the humanitarian community in recent times.

33. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is trying to coordinate the much-expanded range of emergency activities. Its task is being complicated by the more active and extensive intervention being demanded of the United Nations in its peace-keeping operations. It appears that within the United Nations system, despite the current efforts undertaken by DHA,[23] coordination is a major challenge given the long-standing differences of approach and opinion among the policy, peace-keeping, supplies delivery, and public mobilization arms of different United Nations bodies.

34. The increased frequency and intensity of humanitarian interventions have stimulated new thinking on how to prevent or mitigate future emergency situations whatever their causes. Given the nature of the problem, the humanitarian agencies have increasingly come to recognize the importance of investing resources in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. However, this growing awareness has not been translated into operational guidelines and action. The UNHCR with its conflict prevention strategy and policy for its implementation is, apparently, one of the very few exceptions among the United Nations system organizations.

D. Post-conflict peace-building

35. To be truly successful, United Nations peace-keeping operations are often followed by efforts to consolidate peace which are generally known as post-conflict peace-building (PCPB). Such measures, designed to address the root causes of a conflict, include not only promotion of development or humanitarian assistance, but also measures aimed at re-establishing or strengthening political and administrative structures.[24] In particular, they cover:

(a) emergency humanitarian assistance (e.g. food aid, short-term rehabilitation, etc.);

(b) demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and other estranged groups into the civilian and productive life of the country (e.g. in El Salvador, Nicaragua), which involve provision of short-term emergency programmes to satisfy their immediate needs in terms of food, training, jobs, etc.;

(c) demilitarization of the police and development of the civilian police forces;

(d) building or strengthening of judiciary and other public institutions and promoting human rights;

(e) reconstruction of physical infrastructure, including damaged bridges, roads, railways, and power utilities and development of human resources and employment possibilities; and

(f) confidence-building measures and reconciliation among former adversaries, with the aim of preventing the recurrence of war.

36. Some of the United Nations programmes and agencies, for example, the FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNESCO and the World Bank have the technical capability to play a leading role in different aspects of PCPB. For example, after the peace-keeping stage of settlement of the military conflict in El Salvador, the United Nations continued to play a central role in implementing the reforms proposed in the El Salvador peace accords, ambitious by any standard and therefore aptly described as a "negotiated revolution". They, in particular, included the creation of a national civil police, separate and distinct from the armed forces, and the transfer of land to former combatants and guerrillas supporters who had occupied land during the over years and an arms-for-land exchange.

37. In this regard, it is also worth noting that, for some years, the ILO has been supporting national efforts to create employment and income-generating opportunities through vocational training and vocational rehabilitation for ex-soldiers and war disabled persons in several countries, such as Cambodia, Mozambique and Namibia. Based on the experience gained so far, the approved ILO Programme and Budget for 1996-97 includes an "action programme" for cross-departmental future activities on skills and entrepreneurship training for countries emerging from armed conflict.

38. However, the financial and human resources needed for these multifaceted and large-scale operations are not always available. For instance, in the case of El Salvador, because of tight budgets in donor countries, foreign financing has not fulfilled expectations. The donor countries are currently revising their aid policies and are reluctant to finance certain types of projects, despite their importance to peace agreements.[25] The problem is exacerbated by the fact that El Salvador is undergoing the parallel process of implementing a rigorous economic stabilization and structural adjustment programme sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank. Short of domestic financing, El Salvador faces a very real dilemma: should it sacrifice economic stabilization to proceed with implementing the peace accords, or should it strictly carry out its stabilization and structural adjustment programme, perhaps endangering the peace?[26] Apart from the problem of lack of funds, the above example also shows a certain disconnectedness between the two processes, and the lack of transparency between actions of the different participants involved.

39. These problems would certainly have been solved through: (a) periodic and systematic exchange of information at the appropriate levels, and (b) enhanced coordination between organizations and agencies involved in peace-related activities under the auspices of the United Nations as well as integration of their goals. Unfortunately, the existing inter-agency coordination bodies act rather as fora for general discussion than mechanisms of substantive coordination. In this context it may be mentioned that the

Heads of State and Government of seven major industrialized nations and the President of the European Commission stated recently in Halifax that they would ask "the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations to establish a new coordination procedure, supported as necessary by existing resources, to facilitate a smooth transition from the emergency to the rehabilitation phase of a crisis, and to cooperate more effectively with donor countries".[27]

40. Given the diversity and complexity of problems in countries coming out of armed conflicts or situations of extreme socio-political upheaval, PCPB activities, being only complementary to national efforts, are carried out in very difficult conditions. As mentioned above, these countries have, in general, economies in shambles or at least severely distorted. More often than not, they have hard choices to make, as the imperative of peace consolidation competes with the conventional imperatives of development, which puts tremendous pressure on policy decisions and especially on budgetary allocations. Therefore, the United Nations has a role to play in helping countries in PCPB situations choose development strategies, especially as they affect peace consolidation. To be able to do so, the United Nations needs to strengthen its analytical and operational capacities to help countries in formulating policies that are well conceived, transparent, credible and implementable, from both political and socio-economic points of view.[28] UNESCO, for example, is assisting countries coming out of war to guarantee that peace-building components are included in the development projects.

41. It is beyond doubt that post-conflict peace-building activities help to avoid a recurrence of major crises or violence. However, in view of the cost and efforts involved in PCPB, the question inevitably arises whether it is not more reasonable and cheaper to assist these countries in pre-conflict situation - when some sort of economy and infrastructure still exist - than to restore an economy ruined by the ravages of war. Acting in post-conflict situations, to some extent, may be compared to "closing the barn door after the horse is gone".

E. Preventive deployment

42. In his "An Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General made reference to the preventive deployment through the United Nations presence in situations when a country feels threatened or in case of internal crisis, upon the request of the country, without prejudice to the principle of the respect of the sovereignty of the State. He thus attempted to categorize preventive deployment separately from peace-keeping. It may be mentioned, however, that many so-called traditional peace-keeping operations have a preventive deployment or containment character, including those in Cyprus, India-Pakistan and the Middle East.

43. The first "preventive deployment" which has created an important precedent, was undertaken in 1993. In accordance with the decision of the Security Council of December 1992, troops were sent to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which was intended to prevent the violence in Bosnia from spreading and causing "a broader European war". Today there are some 1,100 Blue Helmets serving there. Also in 1993, the Security Council expanded the mandate of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), deployed on the Iraq-Kuwait border, from one of border monitoring to one designed to deter possible incursions.

44. So far, preventive deployment may be described as successful and stands as an example to be followed in other potential conflict areas. However, it is hampered by the lack of resources and occasional resistance by authorities in conflict-prone countries to United Nations and international involvement.

45. The General Assembly is currently discussing a proposal to establish, under the auspices of the Security Council, a United Nations rapid deployment brigade. The possible tasks would be predominantly in the field of preventive deployment when crises are imminent, peace-keeping during the interval between a Security Council decision and the arrival of the international peace-keeping force, as well as deployment in humanitarian emergency situations[29]. A United Nations brigade is intended to be complementary to existing instruments for peace-keeping operations and to other initiatives in the field of crisis management, such as the strengthening of the United Nations Secretariat and its Department of Peace-keeping Operations, further development of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System, and the development of regional peace-keeping arrangements. According to the above-mentioned proposal, the added value of a United Nations brigade would lie in its ability to serve as an adequate stop-gap measure when a crisis became imminent and deployment of international forces was required at very short notice. Depending on the modalities chosen for financing this brigade, its annual costs can roughly be estimated at between US$250 and 300 million[30].

F. Some lessons learned

46. The United Nations is wrestling with current crises by applying traditional approaches, while trying at the same time to make necessary adjustments in order to render its operations more efficient. It also endeavours to look into the future, drawing as many lessons as it can from the past both positive (e.g. Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique and El Salvador) and negative experiences (e.g. Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda).

47. Without prejudice to the on-going efforts to strengthen and renovate **peace-keeping operations**, (e.g. creating a United Nations Rapid Deployment Brigade) a point can be made that the United Nations cannot fight wars. In any event, the first and one of the most important lessons learned from the recent PKOs is that peace-keeping is not the most efficient and cost-effective way of dealing with conflicts. On many occasions Member States emphasized that peace-keeping cannot be a substitute for political settlement of disputes. Therefore, they increasingly advocate that emphasis in United Nations activities should be placed on conflict prevention, which is the very raison d'être of the Organization.

48. The number of internal armed conflicts, the economic and social devastation they unleash, and the massive increase in refugee flows they engender all lead to the conclusion that traditional approaches to dealing with these conflicts are failing. A new strategic vision is needed if the world community is going to learn how to prevent war. In particular, Member States stress that it is equally important to address the root causes of conflict, especially in the areas of social and economic development.[31]

49. However, the United Nations, despite its great potential in terms of its mandate and expertise to prevent conflicts, is still in some way ill-fitted for this task. There is broad consensus that conflict prevention, management, or resolution requires that nationals of countries in conflict situation themselves act as a rudder, guiding peace processes forward and working with local disputants to bring about conciliation. Outside parties, including the United Nations, can contribute by providing support to propel the search for peace forward, but peace cannot be imposed from outside.

50. Another lesson to be learned from the recent experience is that autonomy, impartiality and neutrality are easier to maintain in peace-keeping operations where the political objectives of the deployment are clear and accepted by the parties, as in Cambodia, Mozambique or traditional "consensual" peace-keeping. When political objectives are unclear and peace-keeping is launched in the midst of a conflict, as in Somalia or former Yugoslavia, tensions can and do arise between the political, military and humanitarian components.

51. With regard to the **humanitarian component** of United Nations operations, it would appear that whatever the type of operation, it is essential for the humanitarian organizations to maintain the strictly non-political, neutral and impartial nature of their mandates.[32] The operations of "the second generation" have, in particular, revealed that the relationship between the political and the humanitarian activities is very complicated. Political and humanitarian objectives do not always coincide, and may sometimes even contradict each other; nor are political and military means consistent with fundamental humanitarian principles. Achieving political objectives may require the use of force against one party or the other, whereas humanitarian action is premised on the principles of impartiality and neutrality. Impartiality means helping victims on all sides of the conflict. Neutrality means more than being even handed, it means being independent from political goals and considerations. The provision of humanitarian assistance should not and must not become linked to progress in political negotiations, nor to other political objectives.

52. The neutral and impartial image of humanitarian action can be jeopardized in the context of Chapter VII operations using force, which must by definition be directed against one or more parties. When the United Nations decides to use military force against a party to the conflict, it may become necessary for humanitarian organizations, as far as feasible, to distance themselves, if they are to effectively discharge their mandates.

53. Another important lesson is that short-term humanitarian assistance can never replace **long-term development** support. The enlarged scope of conflict activities, and the defects of the traditional modus operandi for dealing with them have brought to light quite a number of flaws of the United Nations system. The most serious are the inadequate coordination that exists between the different bodies of the Organization, and its inability to address problems associated with peace and development in rigorous, integrated, transparent, coherent and consistent ways. "Put simply, the political and economic sides of the house barely talk to each other; peacemakers and economists do not speak the same language and so find it difficult to communicate"[33].

54. The example of El Salvador referred to in paragraph 38 above has demonstrated basic deficiencies in the international community's mechanisms for dealing with complex situations of countries as they emerge from civil war or from acute national crisis. The lesson to be learned is that when the United Nations is engaged in preventive diplomacy or peace-making operations, developmental agencies should be consulted. The same

approach vis-à-vis the United Nations should be used by developmental agencies once they intend to get involved in activities addressing root causes of conflict. What is most important is that the processes of peace settlement and development be implemented in an integrated manner.

55. Each conflict being unique, standard methods to deal with them are not possible. In each case a strategic concept, based on an objective appraisal of conflict situation, is needed. The scale and complexity of the problems faced in dealing with conflicts are such that the only realistic approach is **concerted action** involving all levels of the international community (the non-governmental community, local peacemakers, international organizations, scholars and governments) as well as cooperation within the components of that community to maximize the impact of their respective strengths.[34]

56. Finally, one of the key principles of conflict prevention is to deal with conflicts at the lowest level possible to prevent a cycle of escalation. It is less costly and more humane to meet threats to human security upstream rather than downstream, early rather than late.

"The fact remains that effective, preventive diplomacy is still in its infancy as far as the UN is concerned"[35].
Daniel L Spiegel

II. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE UNITED NATIONS: PAST ATTEMPTS AND PRESENT PROBLEMS

A. General

57. The first among the four main purposes of the United Nations stipulated in its Charter is the maintenance of international peace and security. Chapter VI, entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", provides in Article 33, paragraph 1 that "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice". Calibrated, carefully considered approaches may prevent the conflict from escalating to the point where intrusive action is required.

58. The Charter also sets out a framework for the peaceful resolution of international disputes, namely through "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace".[36] Thus, preventive diplomacy is viewed in the Charter as a vehicle of ensuring international peace and security.

59. Preventive diplomacy is most successful when it is applied early, well before armed conflict is likely. But it has unfortunately been the case too often in the United Nations system that preventive diplomacy efforts have been attempted too late, when escalation is so advanced that a slide into hostilities is almost inevitable[37]. Timely application of preventive diplomacy is considered by the General Assembly as the most desirable and efficient means of easing tensions before they result in conflict.[38]

60. While peace-keeping is the most visible part of United Nations activities, preventive diplomacy, until recently, has been the most untraceable. It is true that preventive diplomacy is a politically very sensitive area which often requires much discretion and confidentiality, and as such is mostly carried out behind-the-scenes. It lacks the obvious media impact of peace-keeping operations, let alone full scale, war-waging, peace-enforcement.[39] Therefore, more often than not, it is hard to determine whether preventive diplomacy efforts actually prevented the deterioration of a situation or whether it would have resolved itself without the United Nations intervention. In contrast, it is easy to establish when preventive diplomacy has failed.

61. In his forward-looking report, "An Agenda for Peace", prepared in response to the summit meeting of the Security Council, the Secretary-General defined preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur".[40] While for some analysts this definition failed to clearly distinguish between conflicts, in the sense of a dispute between parties, and armed conflict, it was noted by the General Assembly in its resolution 47/120. The same resolution recognized that "preventive diplomacy may require such measures as confidence-building, early warning, fact-finding and other measures in which consultations with Member States, discretion, confidentiality, objectivity and transparency should be combined as appropriate".[41]

62. Thus, preventive diplomacy is not only accepted as a notion, but is now also recognized as a potentially effective tool for action. However, existing mechanisms and mechanisms which will be created, as well as ad hoc arrangements, should be utilized to the full in any situation where there is a need for conflict prevention. Within the framework of such mechanisms or arrangements, the need for coordinated action should be given priority and preventive diplomacy must be fully integrated into the United Nations system[42].

B. The role of the main organs

63. Given the scale of involvement of the United Nations in diverse conflicts around the world, Member States advocate a greater role to be played by main United Nations organs in conflict prevention. In General Assembly resolution 47/120, they, inter alia, *emphasized* "the need for all organs and bodies of the United Nations, as appropriate, to intensify their efforts to strengthen the role of the Organization in preventive diplomacy".

64. The role and prerogatives of the **General Assembly** in the maintenance of international peace and security, including its role to "call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security"[43], are provided for in Articles 11, 12, 35 and 36 of the Charter. Recently, however, a number of Member States, taking into account that conflicts continue to take place predominantly in areas of the developing world, called upon the General Assembly to play a greater role in conflict prevention. Some of them questioned whether an international climate of opinion that would support preventive diplomacy might be expected without an effort on the part of the various United Nations organs, in particular the General Assembly." In his closing statement, the President of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly declared that "due to its universal character, the Assembly is the most competent United Nations organ for dialogue and conflict prevention".[44]

65. In Section VII ("Role of the General Assembly in preventive diplomacy") of resolution 47/120, the General Assembly emphasized that "together with the Security Council and the Secretary-General, it has an important role in preventive diplomacy [and] has to work in close cooperation and coordination with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and consistent with their respective mandates and responsibilities".[45] In the same resolution, the General Assembly decided to explore ways and means to support the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his report entitled "An Agenda for Peace" to promote the utilization of the General Assembly, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, by Member States so as to bring greater influence to bear in pre-emptying or containing any situation which is potentially dangerous or might lead to international friction or dispute.

66. Chapter VI (Article 33) of the Charter gave the **Security Council** the primary responsibility in matters of preventive diplomacy. The Council can take a variety of conflict prevention, management and resolution initiatives, including fact-finding and observation, the imposition of sanctions, and the dispatch of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions. The Council can also follow up the Secretary-General's initiatives, in particular by authorizing expanded missions, some of which acquire separate funding as a peace-keeping operation. Until recently, the Security Council, whose workload in terms of meetings and resolutions adopted[46] has increased enormously, was only marginally involved in preventive diplomacy. Over the year 1994, the Council dispatched an

unprecedented number of missions, all of them to African destinations: Burundi (twice), Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and Western Sahara. These missions have conspicuously demonstrated that the Security Council could play a much more active role in preventive diplomacy. They also allowed to establish a new kind of cooperative partnership with the Secretariat for that purpose both at Headquarters and in the field.

67. Security Council missions are only one means of its more active involvement in preventive diplomacy. Setting up a committee or an ad hoc Working Group on conflict prevention is another possibility. That entity would maintain regular contact with the Secretary-General and DPA on preventive diplomacy issues and consider the Secretary-General's recommendations for preventive actions. In this regard, it is recalled that the General Assembly *encouraged* "the Secretary-General and the Security Council to engage at an early stage in close and continuous consultation in order to develop, on a case-by-case basis, an appropriate strategy for the peaceful settlement of specific disputes, including the participation of other organs, organizations and agencies of the United Nations system, as well as regional arrangements and organizations as appropriate."[47]

68. In mid-May 1995, the Secretary-General brought to the attention of the heads of DPKO and DPA his wish that all future reports to the Security Council on peace-keeping and peacemaking activities cover not only these activities but also the full range of economic and social activities undertaken by the United Nations system in the country or territory concerned. The Secretary-General stressed that he would like this part of the reports to be statistical and to include for each activity the approximate expenditure of the organization concerned during the reporting period.

69. The participation of the UNDP Administrator in meetings of the Senior Task Force on UN Operations, as referred to in paragraph 116, aided the realization of the Secretary-General's wish. The UNDP Administrator, entrusted by the Secretary-General with strengthening the resident coordinator system, is responsible for ensuring that the relevant resident coordinators provide input on the United Nations activities in the social and economic sectors for inclusion in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council. This is illustrative of the synergism attained for the improvement of the whole of the United Nations system brought about by the systematic coming together of the key political and social and economic components of the system for the establishment and implementation of comprehensive prevention strategy.

70. The Inspectors commend the above initiative of the Secretary-General, which in their opinion, would allow the Security Council to have an overall view of the Organization's activities related to conflict. It also illustrates the Secretary-General's efforts to further enhance relationships between the Secretariat and the Security Council.

71. There is a general view that the role of **ECOSOC** needs to be revitalized. ECOSOC could be the forum for truly reviewing the policy coherence of the system as a whole, ensuring that the substantive work of the Funds. Programmes and Agencies fit together into a seamless service, and that the political advisory responsibilities of Headquarters departments complement and support these bodies activities, linking intergovernmental follow-up to the programmes of action derived from major UN Conferences to in-country implementation of conference objectives, on the one hand, and linking relief to development, on the other. Although the General Assembly has not pronounced itself on possible responsibilities of ECOSOC in preventive action, it certainly has a role to play in this area. In this regard, some Member States proposed to explore a mechanism whereby

ECOSOC could work in partnership with the Security Council to better identify and address economic and social tensions before the outbreak of conflict. In his 1992 Report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council invites ECOSOC "to provide reports, in accordance with Article 65 of the Charter, on those economic and social developments that may, unless mitigated, threatened international peace and security"[48]

72. In the view of some Member States, ECOSOC should not only assist the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary-General to better anticipate problems likely to result in conflicts but also develop strategies to deal with their social and economic causes.

73. The Inspectors believe that pending the General Assembly's consideration of ECOSOC possible contributing to better anticipation of economic and social problems likely to result in a crisis and developing United Nations strategies to deal with economic and social causes of conflicts, some intermediate measures could be taken to ensure greater involvement of ECOSOC in conflict prevention. These, in the Inspectors' view, might include creating an ad hoc working group or a small committee, composed of members of the Security Council and ECOSOC, to facilitate handling of potential crises in an integrated manner.

74. The **International Court of Justice** (ICJ) has also a role to play in conflict prevention. It needs to be mentioned that international legal mechanisms for resolving international conflicts peacefully have existed for decades, but have remained under-utilized, largely because of the unwillingness[49] of states to surrender jurisdiction over their sovereign affairs to an international tribunal. The recent agreement between Hungary and Slovakia to have the Court rule on the merits of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric project represents, however, a potentially significant development. In "An Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General pleaded for greater resort to be made to the ICJ in the peaceful settlements of disputes, including the so-called "chambers" jurisdiction or informal mediation by the court. In this context, it may be mentioned that, in 1994-1995, the Court had before it a record of 13 cases.

C. The role of the Secretary-General

75. Apart from Article 99, there is no mention in the Charter of a role of the **Secretary-General** in preventive diplomacy. As mentioned in para. 66 above, the Charter gave the Security Council the primary responsibility in this area. However, until recently, the preventive diplomacy function has been predominantly performed by the Secretaries-General through their good offices missions. Successive Secretaries-General made significant contributions to preventive diplomacy, and somewhat overshadowed the role of the Security Council in this area. If these good offices are accepted, they can represent an important element in the area of prevention. It is believed that this mediatory role of the Secretary-General should be given full recognition as a preventive mechanism. Consideration might also be given to the possibility of specifically defining this role in a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly with particular reference to its preventive aspect, as distinct from mediatory efforts directed towards a definitive political solution of the conflict situation.[50]

76. As demands on the Secretary-General grew and the number of conflicts on the United Nations' agenda proliferated, it became increasingly unrealistic to expect the Secretary-General to personally provide good offices and mediation for all emerging situations, while at the same time carrying out the many other functions and duties which are required of him. During the biennium 1990-1991, 11 ad hoc missions were undertaken under the good offices of the Secretary-General. In 1994, 18 such missions were undertaken.

77. Therefore, over time and out of necessity, Secretaries-General began assigning senior staff or diplomats as Special Representatives, Personal Representatives, envoys, or emissaries to assist in tracking particular situations and in providing good offices and mediation. In the past, these assignments were typically ad hoc and the choice of personnel was usually limited to a very small number of trusted individuals. However, with the exponential growth of peace-keeping and related missions, the need for these officials grew substantially.

78. In his report to the forty-ninth session, the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly that, as at 31 October 1994, there were 44 special representatives and envoys. Out of this total 23 were assigned to peace-keeping missions (eight at the under-secretary-general level, and 15 at the assistant secretary-general level); 16 appointed to assist the Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices and related functions (12 at the under-secretary-general level, three at the assistant secretary-general and one at the D-2 level); and 5 other special high-level positions, including special advisers to the Secretary-General (four at the under-secretary-general level and one at the D-2 level). He also informed the General Assembly on the functions, titles, type of financing of the above positions as well as on types of contracts of the incumbents.[51] In the meantime, in his statement of 22 February 1995, the President of the Security Council encouraged Member States which had not done so to provide the Secretary-General with the names of persons who might be considered for posts as a special envoy or special representative of the Secretary-General, together with other resources both human and material which could be useful to missions headed by such figures.[52]

79. The difficulties encountered in exercising preventive diplomacy function were compounded by the non-existence of a systematic and institutionalized approach to early conflict prevention. Until very recently, there has been no secretariat mechanism to assist Member States in implementing their obligations under Chapter VI of the Charter. The lack of such a mechanism might also have been the reason why the Secretary-General has not made more active resort to his powers, under Article 99 of the Charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security.

D. The present Secretariat capacity for preventive diplomacy

80. Preventive diplomacy alongside with good offices, peace-making, peace-keeping, research and the collection and analysis of information are carried out under programme 1 of major programme I "Maintenance of peace and security, disarmament and decolonization" of the 1992-1997 Medium-term plan. They, with the exception of peace-keeping activities, are financed under section 2 of the Programme budget and performed by the Department of Political Affairs. Activities under subprogramme 1 (Good offices, preventive diplomacy and peacemaking) are qualified as those of high priority.

81. The main legislative authority for the subprogramme is the Charter of the United Nations, including Article 99 thereof. Activities are also mandated by resolutions of the Security Council, such as resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 681 (1990) of 20 December 1990, and the General Assembly, one of the most recent of which is its resolution 47/120 A of 18 December 1992 and 47/120 B of 20 September 1993.

(a) Creation and reorganization of DPA

82. The primary responsibility for preventive action rests with DPA. It will be recalled that the Secretary-General established DPA in March 1992. This decision was prompted by the statement of the Security Council adopted at the meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500)[53] and aimed at enhancing the Organization's capacity to provide good offices and for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, to collect and analyse pertinent information in order to alert the relevant intergovernmental organs about impending crises, and to carry out mandates decided upon by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other competent organs.

83. The Department was initially headed by two Under-Secretaries-General, each with geographically defined responsibilities and functions[54] and incorporated most and in some cases all the activities of the following former departments and offices: Office of Political and General Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services; Office for Research and the Collection of Information; Department of Political and Security Council Affairs; Department for Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonization and Trusteeship; and Department for Disarmament Affairs.

84. In March 1993, steps were taken to reorganize part I of the Department of Political Affairs in order to strengthen its capacity in the fields of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, which were intended to be the primary focus of its work. This decision reflected the approach to the maintenance of international peace and security outlined in "An Agenda for Peace"[55], as well as the decisions adopted thereon by principal organs of the United Nations, notably General Assembly resolution 47/120 A of 18 December 1992 and a series of statements by the President of the Security Council (S/24728, S/24872, S/25036, S/25184, S/25344, S/25493 and S/25696).

85. In March 1994, the Department was merged under the direction of a single Under-Secretary-General supported by two Assistant Secretaries-General with clearly defined functional and geographical responsibilities: one Assistant Secretary-General is responsible for activities related to the General Assembly, its subsidiary organs and preventive diplomacy and peacemaking in the Americas, East Asia and Europe; and the other Assistant Secretary-General is responsible for the Security Council and preventive diplomacy and peacemaking in Africa and West Asia.

(b) DPA's current mission

86. The mission of the restructured DPA has been formulated as that to provide advice and support on all political matters to the Secretary-General in the exercise of his global responsibilities under the Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. In other words DPA, by definition, should become the principal source of political advice to the Secretary-General. With regard to preventive diplomacy and related activities, DPA is mandated to: (a) monitor, analyse and assess political developments throughout the world; (b) identify potential or actual conflict in whose control and resolution the

United Nations can play a useful role; (c) recommend to the Secretary-General appropriate actions in such cases and execute the approved policy; (d) assist the Secretary-General in carrying out political activities decided by him and/or mandated by the General Assembly and the Security Council; (e) provide the Secretary-General with briefing materials and supports him in the political aspects of his relations with Member States.

87. Preventive diplomacy function, including monitoring and maintenance of close cooperation with regional and subregional organizations is being performed by DPA six regional divisions. Since, however, preventive diplomacy is mentioned together with peacemaking, it is difficult to determine the weight of preventive diplomacy in the current programme of DPA. The Secretary-General, in his report on the work of the Organization specifies that "In the preventive field, its role is to identify the action required, with execution being entrusted to the specialist department or other agency concerned. In the peacemaking field, its role generally includes execution as well."[56]

(c) DPA resources

TABLE 1

Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking
(budget allocations in thousands of United States dollars)

	1992-1993 expenditures	1994-1995 appropriations	1996-1997 estimates
Preventive diplomacy and peace-making	5573.4	8357.3	17.390
Research and collection of information	676.4	1070.2	
Good offices, [preventive diplomacy and peace-making]	167.3	971.1	
Total	6417.1	10398.6	17.390

Source: proposed programme budget for the biennium 1996-1997 (A/50/6 (sect.2), 12 May 1995).

TABLE 2

Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking (human resources)

	1992-1993	1994-1995	1996-1997
Professional category and above			
D-2	4	4	6
D-1	4	4	7
P-5	6	8	15(2)
P-4/3	6	14	26(1)
P-2/1	8	2	5
Total	28	32	59(3)
General Service Category			
Principal levels	-	-	
Other levels	12	14	32
Total	12	14	32
Grand Total	40	46	91(3)

Note: figures in brackets indicate temporary posts.

88. Tables 1 and 2 reflect progressive increase of resources made available for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. Table 1 shows, in particular, that 13.8 per cent of DPA regular budget for 1994-1995 were allocated to good offices, preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, and 1.5 per cent to the research and the collection of information, whereas in 1996-1997, 29.3 per cent of the DPA's proposed budget has been allocated to its programme of work on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, including collection and analysis of information. This growth was obtained through redeployment of resources within the Department whose overall resources for 1996-1997 are expected to diminish by 2.5 per cent.[57]

89. It should be noted, however, that, while due to the recent substantial increase of allocated resources preventive diplomacy and peacemaking has become the most important component of DPA's work programme, followed by disarmament (23.3 per cent). The Organization will spend on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking only 0.65 per cent of its regular budget. Compared to US$3.6 billion and US$4.0 billion being currently spent on peace-keeping operations and humanitarian assistance, respectively, the resources allocated to preventive diplomacy reveal what a tiny fraction (0.068 per cent) they represent in the overall, excluding post-conflict peace-building, United Nations efforts aimed at dealing with current conflicts and related humanitarian emergencies.

90. Despite the importance and cost-effectiveness of preventive diplomacy there are presently only 32 professional and 14 general service staff assigned to tasks relevant to such diplomacy (together with peacemaking), "compared with around 60,000 United Nations peace keepers in place at the moment - and approximately 30 million armed service personnel worldwide"[58]. The Inspectors conclude that the United Nations is still seriously under-funded and under-staffed in the area of preventive diplomacy. The United

Nations must upgrade its capacity to the point where it can offer an effective dispute resolution service to its members providing low profile, skilled, third party assistance through good offices, mediation and the like[59].

(d) DPA activities

91. Since its restructuring into the present configuration on 1 March 1994, DPA has been actively involved in preventive diplomacy or peacemaking in about 30 disputes or conflicts and participated in approximately 45 exploratory, fact-finding and good offices missions. The six regional divisions are responsible for the political direction of a number of field missions engaged in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking or human rights monitoring, including those in Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Somalia (currently located in Nairobi). The similarly direct the activities of the United Nations Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and Special Envoys of the Secretary-General who are engaged in peacemaking activities on a part-time basis, including those working on Georgia and Tajikistan. They also are responsible for certain political elements in the work of peace-keeping operations and for a number of good offices missions of the Secretary-General, including those related to Cyprus, East Timor and Myanmar. They support the Under-Secretary-General in discharge of his responsibility for finalizing for submission to the Secretary-General all the latter's reports on peace-keeping operations. A six-monthly Management Plan is also prepared by the Department. It outlines the major objectives to be achieved and the actions to be taken in pursuit of those objectives.

(e) Recent measures for enhancing policy analysis capability

92. The Inspectors observe that, until recently, DPA has had only limited policy analysis and early warning capability. The desk officers have been overwhelmed by routine work, e.g., preparation of briefing materials, drafting press statements and report to the Security Council, etc. With an aim of enhancing DPA's policy analysis capability relating to preventive diplomacy, a Policy Analysis Team was created in March 1995. The Team consists of one officer from each of the six regional Divisions, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and the Electoral Assistance Division who has been designated to assume the functions of policy analyst.

93. The primary function of this team is to identify situations of potential and/or actual conflict in whose control or resolution the United Nations could prima facie play a useful role, and to formulate policy options for consideration by senior staff of the Department. The policy analysts work under the supervision of their respective Division Directors and in close consultation with all the desk officers of their respective Divisions, who help identify situations of potential and/or actual conflict. Each policy analyst presents proposals on specific issues to the Team as a whole for its consideration and discussion. The Team has been meeting regularly on a bi-weekly basis. Establishing the policy analysis team has been preferred by DPA to that of setting up a distinct Policy Analysis Unit.

94. In this connection, it may be worth mentioning that a Policy and Analysis Unit was also established in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for DPKO. In accordance with the Organization Manual, the Unit, although its tasks are restricted to those situations in which there is a peace-keeping operation, provides in-depth research and analysis of emerging policy questions and gathers information on related activities undertaken by intergovernmental, regional and non-governmental organizations, as well as research

institutions, and assists and coordinates with other organizational units in the Department in the formulation of policies and procedures. The Unit is also responsible for the preparation of pre-session documentation for the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations and for its technical and substantive servicing, and provides related services during sessions of the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly as well as for various other ad hoc intergovernmental committees on issues relating to peace-keeping.[60]

95. By way of conclusion, it may be mentioned that, over the years, preventive diplomacy despite its importance provided for in the Charter, did not occupy the prominent place in the United Nations activities as qualified by some analysts it remained sort of "a sleeping beauty" that has only recently been awakened from a deep sleep. Notwithstanding the emphasis made by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council, practical measures undertaken by the Secretary-General to enhance this function through setting up and reorganization of DPA, it remains incommensurate to the challenges of diffusing conflicts before they occur. The overall volume of resources devoted to preventive diplomacy as shown in para 89 above is negligible and the number of staff in DPA, most of whom only partially assigned to preventive diplomacy, too small to provide the necessary service.

96. The second difficulty in enhancing United Nations preventive diplomacy activities lies in limited access to available information, due partly to the lack of funds and not sufficient analytical capacity available in DPA. The setting-up of Policy Analysis Team is an attempt to close this gap. However, a very modest one compared to the above mentioned challenges. Moreover, the Divisional Analysts do not yet have at their disposal the necessary electronic technology means to assist them in their analysis. The Divisional Analysts, as planned by DPA, would be asked to concentrate, for a particular period, on two or three issues which would appear to him/her as well as to the Division Director and the Assistant Secretary-General the most serious situation in that division's area of responsibility or the situation which offer the best prospects for effective action by the United Nations.

97. The third issue is the need for enhancing professionalism of the Department staff. In fact, during 1994 a number of training programmes were implemented (senior-level management development programme, mid-level development programme, information technology training, drafting and political analysis workshops). However, methodological materials, handbooks on conflict prevention/resolution, including conducting fact-finding missions, etc. have yet to be prepared.

98. Furthermore, it appears that there also has been a problem of feedback from the Secretary-General's Office, for example, on the briefing and other materials prepared for the Secretary-General by DPA. Though on the surface it may appear as a problem of management culture, insufficient feedback may affect the efficiency and substantive work of the Department.

"Peace requires a comprehensive endeavour, across the spectrum of action and time" (B.Boutros-Ghali)[61]

III. TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE CONFLICT PREVENTION

A. Comprehensive conflict prevention concept and its elements

99. Increases in the devastating effects of violent internal conflicts since the end of the Cold War, PKO's limitations as recently demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and other countries, as well as enormous costs involved in post-conflict peace-building and humanitarian assistance in post-conflict situations necessitate increasingly a preventive approach to conflict. Recent conflicts made it crystal clear that in the today's world the security which nations seek cannot be obtained without confronting the need to act before conflicts erupt, before states disintegrate, before massive numbers of people flee across the borders in the wake of violence. The best solution to security crises is to remove or alleviate the factors that cause people, groups, and governments to resort to violence. Once violence breaks out, the international community's ability to act is limited.

100. Moreover, emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures and concerted action, particularly in pre-conflict peace-building and peace-making, would obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping and PCPB operations, which Member States find difficult to finance. It is not only cheaper, but also wiser and more humane to prevent conflicts than to undertake major politico-military efforts to resolve them. Indeed, the cost related, for example, to demining and short-run rehabilitation (repair of roads, bridges and schools, improvement of health services, reactivation of agricultural production) can be avoided.

101. The General Assembly, in its resolution 47/120, *emphasized* that "International Peace and Security must be seen in an integrated manner and that the efforts of the Organizations to build peace, justice, stability and security must encompass not only military matters, but also, through its various organs within the respective areas of competence, relevant political, economic, social, humanitarian, environmental and developmental aspects."[62] Indeed, what is needed is a comprehensive preventive strategy. It must first focus on the underlying political, social, economic, and environmental causes of conflict. Over the long run, easing these is the most effective way to prevent conflict. In this connection, it may be added that the distinction between peace and security and development had too often been a matter for sterile debate, with attempts to trade off one for the other. Any viable modern concept of international peace, let alone peace within States, must recognize, however, that the two are indissolubly (inextricably) interlinked.

102. However, peace-makers and economists do not mingle naturally and very little theoretical thinking has been done on the relationship between these disciplines. In the field, action has been disjointed and mostly ad hoc in response to specific situations or problems. There has not been a global strategy to the problems of a particular country, incorporating all variables comprising the many different actors in an integrated and coherent fashion, linking aspects related primarily to development with those relating primarily to the consolidation of peace. Furthermore, it is not clear where responsibility for developing such a global strategy lies.[63]

103. The political and economic realities of today require what the Secretary-General has referred to in his "An Agenda for Peace" as an "**integrated approach to human security**"[64] (emphasis added). Under such an approach, humanitarian, political, military and socio-economic problems should be addressed jointly rather than separately as has often been the case[65]. Only an integrated approach can avert the political clash of competencies and waste of resources that occurs when various institutions carry out specific mandates independently and without common purpose. An integrated approach to pre-conflict peace-building may be the only feasible way to address to sources of conflict, thus avoiding an occurrence of major crisis or violence. The need for the United Nations to become more immersed in the multi-disciplinary aspects of pre-conflict peace-building requires major rethinking and analytical and operational redefinition of relationship and comparative advantages of all actors involved.

104. It is only through an integrated approach that the common capacity to deal with threats to peace and security can be strengthened. Therefore, an integrated approach to conflict prevention requires not only the involvement of the entire United Nations system but also of the international community as a whole.

105. Accordingly, the Inspectors believe that the United Nations requires a **comprehensive conflict prevention strategy**, which should comprise the following major elements: (a) preventive diplomacy as a specific and well defined subprogramme and (b) pre-conflict peace-building or activities addressing root causes of conflicts in a pre-conflict situation. Both types of activity should be carried out in an integrated manner. In order to follow a truly integrated approach, it is essential first to build internal bridges between the political and economic parts of the United Nations Secretariat, including economic commissions. Once this common approach is ingrained, the United Nations should work more closely with all of its programmes and agencies, particularly the Bretton Woods institutions, and the regional development banks, thus enabling it to draw upon the human and financial resources in all matters of peace and security.[66]

106. Implementation of this strategy implies, firstly, the availability of a structured conflict prevention mechanism, coupled with an adequate early warning system as a management tool of conflict prevention function and, secondly, active involvement of all actors (governments, United Nations system organizations, multilateral financial institutions, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, research and academic institutions, etc.) for concerted action.

B. Up-grading United Nations capacity in preventive diplomacy

107. The previous chapters clearly demonstrated that, in order to bring about international peace and security the United Nations has used all means made available to it: preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace-building and peace enforcement. They also reflect the emerging consensus that more could and should be done to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts by giving increased attention to preventive diplomacy. There is a general understanding that resolution of conflicts require patient diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that would permit the building of confidence and negotiated solutions to long-standing differences.

108. An essential and accepted principle of preventive diplomacy is respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the political independence of States. Preventive action can take many forms including the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General, the use of special envoys, direct contacts between senior political figures, small field missions for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking (or even preventive deployments of military or civilian police contingents.) One of the advantages of preventive diplomacy is that it has a dominant political component, which must maintain its central place, even when resort to other instruments turns out to be necessary. By nature, it is non-intrusive and non-coercive.

109. As mentioned already, the share of preventive diplomacy in the overall volume of the United Nations resources being spent on dealing with current conflicts is negligible. It could have not been possibly expected that the present DPA, whose professional staff members are only partially involved in preventive diplomacy, could ensure an enhanced service on preventive diplomacy.

110. One of the most promising approaches to upgrading United Nations preventive diplomacy would be to equip the Organization with the capacity to offer a dispute resolution service to its members, providing skilled third party assistance through good offices and mediation. This would include every encouragement of domestic efforts being pursued to promote the peaceful settlement of conflicts before the United Nations intervenes or coercive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter are set in motion.[67]

111. To be able to carry out this function, it is essential for the United Nations to have a clear and accurate understanding of the complexities of any situation in which it contemplated involvement or intervention. Analytical capacity is needed to objectively identify root causes of conflict, as well as actors in each conflict and their actual agendas. For example, common qualification of a conflict as "ethnic" does not in many instances explain its real causes. As observed by one member of the Security Council, such qualification had too often been a result of political convenience, intellectual laziness, or the motivation to accept a situation as insoluble.

112. The Inspectors believe that, if properly resourced and developed, DPA holds considerable promise for strengthening the Secretariat capacity to carry out preventive diplomacy.

(a) Structural refinement/Conflict prevention unit

113. Accordingly, the Inspectors suggest not only to attach a higher priority to preventive diplomacy but also to allocate to DPA increased resources for this function, inter alia, through shifting resources from low priority areas. Once the department resources are increased and staff enlarged through redeployment of personnel engaged in the related activities within and outside DPA and through, if necessary, recruiting knowledgeable and experienced persons in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, the Secretary-General should undertake the necessary structural refinement of the Department. In the Inspectors' opinion, it should include, as an option, the setting-up of a specific conflict prevention unit. The major functions of DPA thus strengthened in the area of preventive diplomacy would be:

(a) carrying out an action-oriented analysis of situations which could possibly degrade into conflict, by consolidating internal and external information;

(b) proposing to the Secretary-General appropriate actions with a streamlined channel of communications (access) to facilitate early action;

(c) assisting the Secretary-General in carrying out preventive diplomacy actions (such as fact-finding, mediation and good offices missions) decided by him and/or mandated by the Security Council;

(d) providing secretariat services to the Security Council on preventive diplomacy issues; and

(e) serving as a "core" for small field missions, if and when necessary.

114. The Inspectors believe that structural refinement (including an option of setting up a conflict prevention unit) which would provide for a sharpened focus on preventive diplomacy will be one of the major steps to upgrade United Nations conflict prevention function.

(b) Regional conflict prevention teams

115. As a supplement to the measures to be taken as described above (paras 113 - 114), consideration may be given to setting up, if necessary and feasible, in the United Nations regional centres (venues of the regional commissions), preventive diplomacy teams, which would assess evolution of situations that could possibly degrade into conflicts and recommend appropriate measures to or through DPA. They would, as necessary and in accordance with instructions of the United Nations Headquarters, undertake appropriate actions, including establishing links with respective governments, parties, fractions and groups involved in order to diffuse or head-off conflicts. These teams, as and when necessary, should be assisted by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (political issues) and the United Nations Resident Coordinators (economic, social and humanitarian issues) serving (stationed) in countries of the respective regions. The possibility of involvement of representatives of regional/subregional organizations, regional commissions and other United Nations offices as well as NGOs in the work of these teams should be also envisaged.

(c) Conflict prevention task force

116. The Secretary-General has established the Senior Task Force on United Nations Operations which includes DHA, DPA, DPKO plus the Secretary-General's special advisers and the Legal Counsel and the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management. UNDP Administrator has also been participating since early 1995. Nothing of the kind, however, exists with regard to conflict prevention as such. The Inspectors believe that such a task force could also be established, to facilitate, on the basis, recommendations made by DPA, a coordinated and multifunctional United Nations approach to conflict prevention. In addition to DPA, such a task force should comprise, in particular, DHA, DPKO, DHA, DDSMS, DESIPA, DPCSD, UNDP, UNHCR and HCHR/CHR.

(d) Contingent of high-level personalities

117. The importance of the work of Special Representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General for conflict prevention cannot be over-emphasized. It is not surprising, therefore, that Security Council members have been raising the issue of finding solutions to expanding the "contingent" of such high-level personalities. Some Member States have already provided the Secretary-General with the list of their candidates and offered to finance their services. The Inspectors believe that this is a good beginning which would facilitate the implementation of another important element of active preventive diplomacy, i.e. establishing small field missions.

C. Early warning and prevention of conflicts

(a) early warning and its purposes

118. The importance of early warning has been repeatedly stressed as a means of determining the existence of factors likely to give rise to a conflict situation calling for preventive action. Early warning is an important step towards preventive diplomacy and has even been regarded as part of the preventive diplomacy mechanism[68].

119. Early warning of potential crises, including humanitarian disasters, is a key tool in successful preventive action. General Assembly resolutions emphasized that the United Nations should deal in a timely manner with potential and/or actual threats to peace. This requires a reliable and well organized system for collecting and analysing information which would trigger an "early warning" to the international community.[69]

120. The capacity of the United Nations to detect emerging crises at an early stage, its so called "early warning capacity", should be improved. Timely availability of information is indispensable for anticipatory planning. On the basis of "early warning" the United Nations will have to develop plans to deal with emerging crisis.

121. There is often no lack of information about such crises, but, given the differing and sometimes complex roots of conflicts, it is necessary to tap all available sources and to systematize the sharing of such information amongst all those capable of playing an active role in heading off crises breaking out into open conflict. The information is often dispersed and there is a need to coordinate better the existing information, including that from United Nations specialized agencies, regional organizations and to do so in a more systematic fashion.

122. In his "Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General referred also to early-warning systems which have been developing in the United Nations regarding environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accidents, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease. Information from these mechanisms can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be used by the United Nations to alleviate it. Such a process requires continued close cooperation with the various specialized agencies and United Nations organs together with other regional arrangements and organizations.

123. There is obviously a need for integrated efforts of different components of the United Nations system, involving regional organizations where appropriate, to identify at an early stage situations which may give rise to conflicts and to take the necessary measures to prevent such conflicts. In this regard, consideration should be given to establishing a database.[70]

124. Early warning should be viewed as a useful action-oriented management tool (although requiring extensive research work) as well as an ongoing learning process of developing situations. The component of early warning should form a part of a management cycle of early warning, preparedness, action, and post-action evaluation. All of these processes should be handled in a systematic way.

125. Early warning is an alert function, not merely a forecasting or projection endeavour. Warnings should identify the risks and provide possible scenarios of developing situations. Since every event and developing situation has a cause, early warning exercises will necessarily address "root causes".

126. Early warning, as function, albeit a supporting one, cannot be seen in isolation. "To attempt to address early warning issues without placing them within broader policies and strategies of the United Nations could lead to problems. Besides, not locating early warning activities within the context of a United Nation grand strategy could lead to difficulties or to disappointments in the performance of early warning and preventive systems".[71]

(b) From a pilot project to a full-fledged system

127. The first attempt to set up an early warning mechanism in the United Nations Secretariat was made in 1987 with the establishment of the Office of Research and Collection of Information (ORCI). Although this was a welcome beginning, a number of problems, including those of the lack of appropriate infrastructure and personnel issues, meant that ORCI was unable to perform optimally and, therefore, abolished.

128. The recent JIU report "The involvement of the United Nations system in providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance"[72] contains a detailed analysis of different early warning mechanisms which have been developed in the United Nations system at the level of individual organizations and at inter-agency level. One of the most consolidated systems among those described is undoubtedly Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) managed by DHA as an extra-budgetary project funded by one Member State. The objective of HEWS is to compile information from the United Nations agencies and their field offices, Member States, NGOs and the mass media, for the purpose of identifying potential crises with humanitarian implications. To date, a prototype based on time-series data has been developed.

129. The system, when completed, will generate: (a) weekly general reports, outlining the situation in all countries at some level of concern; (b) early warning signals to monitor and identify situations that warrant higher level of concern; (c) follow-up reports that incorporate new information from field offices as well as changes in system indicators; (d) country profiles consisting of a full set of indicator information including present assessment and trends, and detailed maps which can be used for mission and programme planning as well as presentations and briefing.

130. Having got acquainted with HEWS, the Inspectors consider that its scope goes much further than simply supporting humanitarian assistance programmes; that it may, eventually, constitute a core of a consolidated early warning system for supporting the conflict prevention function of the United Nations. Therefore, in the Inspectors' view, it would be more useful to relocate HEWS to DPA to serve as an "analytical support and assessment system" for conflict prevention activities.

131. Meanwhile, with a view to facilitating a consolidated action-oriented analysis, reporting to the Headquarters on the country situation (potential/imminent problems) by the field offices of the United Nations operational agencies (e.g. UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF) as well as by UNICs and the field missions of United Nations departments/offices (DHA, DPA, DPKO, HCHR/CHR) should be regularized, which, in turn, together with the relevant analysis should be channelled systematically to DPA. In this regard, the United Nations Resident Coordinator system should be used more effectively.

132. It will be recalled that at the country level the UN Resident Coordinator is required to exercise team leadership among representatives of the organizations and agencies of the United Nations system. The United Nations Resident Coordinator, who normally represents the Secretary-General at the country level, oversees inter-agency coordination, and, focusing on the social and economic areas of United Nations assistance provided by individual organizations in pursuance of their respective mandates, the Resident Coordinator is required to report routinely to the Administrator of UNDP on conditions adversely influencing or likely to influence operational activities for development. These reports, seeking to reveal failures of development, may provide the early, local-level indicators which reside at the core of complex emergencies.

133. As the situation requires, the United Nations Resident Coordinator will also ensure that pertinent information derived from all in-country United Nations sources is provided to the United Nations system. Concomitantly, the United Nations system is expected to maintain a regular flow of information to the United Nations Resident Coordinator, apprising him/her of early warning signals obtained through other sources. It is within the United Nations Resident Coordinator function that routine monitoring of country situations is maintained through regular information sharing by the United Nations organizations and agencies.

134. In connection with reporting, availability of on-line computer facilities with compatible hardware and software as well as utilization of a standard format is essential to expedite necessary processing. Furthermore, it is important to have close coordination and cooperation among departments/agencies and to come up with preliminary judgements at the field level, on situation in a given spot, through a continuous monitoring.

135. The Inspectors also believe that Member States, the United Nations, specialized agencies, regional organizations, NGOs as well as other sources such as academic and research institutes should be invited to provide relevant information and analysis to DPA. The existing early warning should be better utilized and the early warning capacity should be further developed. In this context, the participants of the Halifax Summit stated: "To help prevent and mitigate emerging crises, including those with human rights and refugee dimensions, we will ask the UN Secretary-General to explore means to improve the analysis and utilization of disaster and conflict-related early warning information, particularly through the High Commissioners on Human Rights and Refugees".[73]

136. Incidentally, the Inspectors are cognizant of difficulties involved in creating a full-fledged early-warning system. One of them is certainly availability of necessary resources and the second is the fact that some Members have certain reservations with regard to setting up a full-fledged early warning capacity in the United Nations Secretariat. The latter, in the Inspectors' view, may be hurdled by ensuring such **transparency** of the system which would not jeopardize its **confidentiality**.

137. The Inspectors recall that early warning is an element and early warning system is only a management tool of preventive diplomacy. Therefore, the requirement "to combine, as appropriate, confidentiality and transparency", recognized by the General Assembly in its resolution 47/120 applies to preventive diplomacy in general and early warning in particular.

(c) From early warning to early action

138. The Inspectors wish to emphasize that "early warning" is not an objective in itself, but a management tool for conflict prevention. In other words, there is no point in strengthening an early warning system unless early action is ensued. The greatest challenge in this area is indeed to ensure transition from early warning to early action. It is the Inspectors' considered opinion that making preventive diplomacy and early warning work is basically a question of political will.

139. Crises in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, have all been subject to early warnings, they are all examples of deaths well foretold. However, both national institutions and the international community failed to act decisively as the conflicts escalated. In Rwanda, reaction was too late and the international community witnessed with horror the degeneration of political conflict into barbaric acts of destruction and genocide. Thus, the real problem is not just early warning, but translating knowledge of an impending crisis into preventive action. A related question is, who should respond to conflict at various points in its escalation?

140. One answer to this question is the notion of "layered responses". As a crisis escalates, local organizations respond first, then subregional and regional organizations, and finally the international community. Local actors such as states, NGOs, or regional organizations may be able to deal with small-scale crises with mediation, conciliation, and negotiation assistance, particularly when they are supported by larger powers in the international community. Outsiders may support intervention to end conflict at various states of their development. Only when a crisis has gone beyond the capacity of local, subregional and regional institutions to respond should intervention by the international community be considered. Above all, close coordination among myriad actors at all stages is required for successful response to conflict. In this context, it needs to be mentioned that, as far as the United Nations is concerned, close and operative cooperation between the Secretariat and Intergovernmental bodies is essential.

"Better to land development today than troops tomorrow"[74]
(James Gustave Speth)

IV. ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICTS

A. Root causes of conflicts

141. The experience shows that conflicts are the results of a variety of factors. The uneven and often inequitable impact of political, social, economic, and environmental change on different segments of a population often gives rise to violent conflicts. In most developing countries, especially in Africa, domestic political and civil conflicts can be attributed directly or indirectly to the pains of **national socio-economic and cultural transformations** that are difficult to manage at the strategic political level and therefore tend to overwhelm the generally weak systems of governance in those countries. In some cases, the result has been the complete or near **collapse of government and central authority**. In the countries of Eastern Europe, the conflicts have been provoked by **systemic transformations** compounded by long-standing **ethnic and religious tensions**.

142. A number of conflicts have, at their root, **disputes over natural resources**. By way of example, some of the current difficulties in the Middle East Peace Process, apart from the well-known historical-political factors, stem from strategic considerations with regard to water resources. The inadequate sharing of water resources common to neighbouring countries, or major water projects which affect the availability of water in other countries, can lead to disputes and even serious conflict. The connection between war and **famine** is indisputable. It is no coincidence that every major famine in recent years has taken place in a war zone. In Africa alone, Angola and Somalia are the latest in a long list that includes Ethiopia, Mozambique, Liberia and Sudan. **Refugee and migratory flows**, being a consequence of many conflicts, can also be a source of tension in host countries, or between host and country of origin. Massive population displacements sometimes, as in former Yugoslavia, the very objective of the conflict.

143. Strong linkages exist between conflicts and **military expenditures**. According to the UNDP report mentioned in para 12 above, developing countries still spend US$ 20.4 billion importing weapons from developed countries in 1993 (this figure does not consider monies spent on indigenous arms production or weapons from developing countries).

144. However, the most fundamental **root cause of many conflicts is poverty and underdevelopment**, although "not all development failures create security crises"[75]. Out of 89 countries cited by UNDP as having major conflicts and political violence, 65 belong to the developing world. The list of countries in or near crises is growing. In this connection, it may be useful to recall that some 1.5 billion people in the world today live in extreme poverty. The conditions of life for twice that number are deplorable. About 67,000 babies are born every day into families earning less than US$7 a week. Worst off are the 47 countries called least developed. With 10 per cent of the world's people, they have 0.1 per cent of the world's income. For more than two decades their per capita income, on average, has declined. Presently, it stands at about US$350. Their share of world trade declined from 0.6 per cent in 1980 to 0.2 per cent in 1992.[76]

145. **The debt burden** facing the developing world continues to mount, now reaching US$1.9 trillion. Sub-Saharan African debt payments, for example, are larger than that region's expenditures on health and education. Unless the debt problem of many developing countries is resolved, their prospects for economic growth and development will remain illusory.

146. A vast increase in **inequality** has occurred. In the last three decades the gap between the richest and poorest 20 per cent of the world's people has doubled, from 30-fold to 60-fold.[77]

147. To remedy this situation, international and bilateral assistance policies, as well as those of civil society in general, should aim to address the alleviation of these root causes of violence. In responding to crises, the international community not only ensures the potential of an expanding global economic pie, but also its own security. To do otherwise, or to do nothing, is to ensure equally the transfer of third world's poverty and underdevelopment to developed countries in the form of illegal aliens, refugees, drugs, crimes, etc. There will be no borders big enough, no army strong enough to suppress the human instinct of survival.[78]

B. Pre-conflict peace-building: needs and means

148. With the turn of the century approaching, the economic, social, environmental and political crises that many developing countries confront have taken on an urgency and a magnitude unparalleled in history. And since behind many conflicts and emergencies, there lies a silent crisis of under-development, it has become increasingly clear that neither emergency relief nor fitful policy interventions are keys to averting conflicts, but a long, quiet process of sustainable human development: that not only generates economic growth but distributes its benefits equitably; that generates environment rather than destroying it; that empowers people rather than marginalizing them. It is development that gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities and providing for their participation in decisions that affect their lives.[79]

149. The concept of peace-building as first presented in "An Agenda for Peace" later appeared to be narrow. It is no longer viewed as efforts to create peace in the wake of hostilities. It now possesses a much broader definition: the creation of conditions to ensure a durable peace. It has to be recognized, however, that the need for an integrated approach to human security, the central idea of "An Agenda for Peace", has so far been largely ignored.

150. It is now being increasingly realized that international assistance to developing countries is an essential expense for global stability. But "the poorer countries do not need more "foreign aid" of the Cold War variety, but they do need assistance, and more of it, to ensure sustainable, people-centered development."[80] This kind of assistance is a vital investment in the future.

151. Within the context of pre-conflict peace-building, the United Nations should be prepared to play a more active and constructive role in helping countries in pre-conflict situations to choose appropriate development strategies. The United Nations should strengthen its analytical and operational capacity to help these countries in formulating policies that are well-conceived, transparent, credible and implementable, from both political and socio-economic points of view.[81]

152. Despite the centrality of development to the concerns of international peace and security, **international support for development is under attack and threatened**, perhaps as never before. The threats comes from many sources, including aid fatigue, competing domestic priorities, sluggish economies, and lack of public understanding. Financial hardship has forced many countries to review their commitments to international development assistance. OECD development assistance has now declined for two years in a row.[82]

153. Indeed, Official Development Assistance (ODA) from DAC Members slumped from US$60.8 billion in 1992 to US$56.0 billion in 1993. Several countries had announced budget cutbacks, commitments had slowed, and the multilateral replenishment cycle moved into its biennial trough. In addition, conditions in a number of recipient countries thwarted some flows that would otherwise have taken place.[83] A reduction by eight per cent in current dollars, equivalent to a six per cent decline in real terms reduced Members' ODA as a share of their GNP from 0.33 per cent in 1992, to 0.30 per cent, the lowest level recorded for two decades.

154. Proportionately, donors' contributions to multilateral institutions fell more sharply (13 per cent in real terms) than their bilateral programmes (down 6 per cent), which had serious implications for the United Nations development system. Indeed, while, on the one hand, demand for the United Nations system assistance has increased dramatically, programmable funds available for supporting development cooperation activities have shown a decline, particularly for technical cooperation. As reported in the Secretary-General's report on funding of operational activities (A/48/940), core contributions to UNDP, for instance, have over the past 20 years remained stagnant in real terms. More recently, Governing Council decision 90/34 called for an 8 per cent annual increase in contributions to UNDP core resources for the 1992-1996 period. Although this target was almost achieved in 1992 resources pledged for the following years have seen drastic cuts. As a result, programme allocations for the 1992-1996 cycle have had to be reduced by 30 per cent, from US$ 4,163 million to US$ 2,972 million.[84]

155. Given the central role of UNDP in extrabudgetary financing, the adverse impact of the fall in its core resources has affected the specialized agencies which have drawn about 40 per cent of their operational resources mainly from UNDP. The decline in UNDP funding, coupled with the increase in national execution, has had a radical effect on their technical cooperation activities, amounting, in some cases, to a reduction of approximately 50 per cent in recent years.[85]

C. United Nations: challenges and activities

156. The challenge facing the United Nations today is how to identify, analyse and tackle more effectively the root causes of conflict situations in any country without infringing on its sovereignty. There is not only a greater need to address these fundamental (root) causes of conflicts, but also, inasmuch as the various factors are in many cases inter-related, to approach them in a comprehensive manner by ensuring appropriate coordination between various factors.

157. The ECOSOC President stated recently that "the root cause behind the international community's inability to realise international peace is recently its failure to effectively address the socio-economic factors that lead to strife.[86] " He qualified as equally important the fact "that the international community has not devised mechanisms that would effectively translate the existing global consensus on broad policies into viable programmes for alleviating socio-economic stress".[87] In fact, while each specialized agency of the United Nations has a new role to play or to streamline, re-orient its activity so that more emphasis is made at addressing root causes of conflicts, "... over the long term, coordinated programmes may be required to ensure that the original causes of war are removed..."[88].

158. Most fundamentally, a new development cooperation framework must consolidate the emerging concept of sustainable people-centered development. Development thinking has evolved from a one-dimensional concept with a near exclusive focus on aggregate economic performance to a richer multidimensional concept with people at its centre. People have not been the predominant objectives of development policy in the past, or even of development assistance, and that is one reason the world today is in so much trouble.[89]

159. In his Agenda for Development Recommendations, the Secretary-General has called upon the Organization to provide leadership in **preventive** and curative **development**. The relevant activities, in his view, should be complementary to peace-keeping, refugee assistance and other humanitarian relief. **Curative development** is being considered as actions aimed at healing the wounds of a society, reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, reconstruction and rehabilitation. It thus, tantamount to post-conflict peace-building.

160. On the other hand, **preventive development** is viewed as a necessary complement to preventive diplomacy, wherefrom the need to "build (within the United Nations) state-of-the-art capabilities to act preventively for development, anticipating and responding to crises, natural and man-made, before they occur." In this endeavour, efforts should be focused on the ability of states themselves to resolve internal conflicts. Specific sectors should be targeted for capacity-building, including judicial and legal structures, institutions and instruments aimed at the protection of minorities and minority cultures, and public service broadcasting.

D. Conflict prevention activities of the United Nations System

161. The paragraphs below describe selected activities carried out by the United Nations system organizations and programmes which may be qualified as preventive development activities.

(a) **United Nations programmes**

UNCTAD

162. Within the broad context of the relationship between political stability and economic development, UNCTAD, as an institution with a strong development mission, endeavours to make a contribution in the framework of its mandate. In implementing activities, which consist of analysis and consensus building leading to policy actions both at the national and international levels, UNCTAD deals with a wide range of issues, including those arising from increasing interdependence among countries and sectors such as in money and finance, trade, technology to commodities, investment and services. UNCTAD's activities, principally aimed at growth and development, in particular that of developing countries, can make a contribution to the social well being and development and hence to political and economic stability.

163. The second dimension of UNCTAD's activities in the same vein relates to responding to the concerns for support to new democracies and to the restored democracies. The new democracies, the most appropriate example being that of countries of Central and Eastern Europe, are characterized not only by the introduction of democratic forms of government but also by far reaching institutional changes, rapid moves to market-based economic systems and towards greater integration into the world economy. The support to be provided to such countries should therefore go beyond assistance for the democratic process at political level and includes measures to address the challenges of a complex economic and economic-related institutional reform.

164. UNCTAD provides policy advice and implements technical cooperation projects aimed at creating new institutional frameworks in areas such as trade policy, services, insurance, customs, maritime transport, restrictive business practices, privatization and foreign direct investment. This is complemented by analytical studies prepared by the secretariat for intergovernmental meetings of the subsidiary bodies of the UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board as well as by Governments themselves in the context of the exchange of national experiences

165. UNCTAD's assistance in a wide-range of areas (in particular trade, debt management, and trade efficiency) is intended to help these countries to overcome specific problems and to enhance the competitiveness of their economies rather than to focus on institution building, as most of such institutions are already in place.

UNDP

(i) General approach

166. Recognizing that the past, present and future development processes are linked to the present by an unbroken chain of happenings, each following the other, UNDP is actively involved in putting into operation the axiom that "preventive development is a necessary complement to preventive diplomacy". Pursuant to UNDP's organizational framework for action to secure preventive and curative development and consistent with Governing Body legislation on the successor programming arrangements approved in 1995, the Executive Board has earmarked five per cent of core resources (approximately US$50 million annually) for preventive and curative activities in "countries in special situations." UNDP is now preparing guidelines for utilization of resources earmarked for countries in

pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis conditions, with particular emphasis on providing direct support for in-country coordination mechanisms operating within the framework of the United Nations resident coordinator system, and enhancing aid coordination, and the efforts of national and international partners to build crisis management capacity.

167. Although typically concerned with the provision of assistance for development, UNDP activities are increasingly being based on operations designed to coordinate the transition from relief to development attained through coordinating interventions of the whole of the United Nations system at the country level. As the central funding and coordinating entity of the United Nations system, UNDP maintains a close relationship with OECD donor countries and core Government ministries of developing countries, with responsibilities for assisting Member States in their efforts to incorporate peace-building programmes in their national development strategies.

(ii) UNDP strategy for preventing emergencies

168. In formulating an operational policy to meet man-made disasters and emergencies, UNDP makes a distinction between the general conditions of poverty, inequality and environmental degradation that may generate instability in the long term, and those that must be addressed as part of a larger effort to promote sustainable human development, and, in the short term, the specific development policies or abuses that may precipitate disasters and emergencies and lead to sporadic or sustained conflicts and violence.

169. As manager and financer of the UN Resident Coordinator system, UNDP is strongly committed to facilitating coordination at both the country and Headquarters levels with a view to maximizing support for the Resident Coordinator's capability to coordinate the whole of the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis process. To guide Resident Coordinators, UNDP has formulated an organizational framework for action to secure preventive and curative development. Within this framework, comprising the roles of the UN Resident Coordinator, the UNDP Country Office and UNDP Headquarters, the responsibility for coordinating UN system activities at the country devolves upon the UN Resident Coordinator, who will:

- encourage the national authorities to use the Country Strategy Note and other programming instructions to identify the level of the country's vulnerability to man-made disasters and initiate with UN Disaster Management Team (DMT) - composed of heads of all UN system agencies in the country - and with national authorities disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness;

- in response to DPA, DHA and UNDP guidance and initiative, and in cooperation with the in-country DMT, develop and maintain early-warning systems which would enhance the government's and the international community's readiness to respond;

- in cooperation with DHA and UNDP, organize a Disaster Management Training Programme and support follow-up activities of the government in building national capacities for disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation;

- in countries with high levels of vulnerability and potential crisis, complement preventive diplomacy, led by DPA, with special development projects and programmes to be formulated by UNDP and other UN agencies, as appropriate, and coordinate initiatives designed to stem looming disaster;

- in countries with a high possibility of crisis and emergency and in full cooperation with national authorities, organize international mobilization of resources in support of the United Nations preventive development initiatives. "Special Consultations" with donors or Round Table meetings conducted with UNDP support or separate Government/Donor/United Nations conferences should be organized for this purpose.

170. The UNDP Country Offices, responsible for providing national capacity building in areas of disaster prevention, mitigation and management, will:

- support and assist the UN Resident Coordinator in his/her organizational and coordination activities related to disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation and resource mobilization;

- use the Country Programming Exercise and the sustainable human development approach to address potentially explosive points in the country's socio-political and economic system and contribute to the prevention and mitigation of potential crisis and disaster;

- assist governments in developing programmes and individual projects that fall within the category of preventive development (better governance, civil service reform, ethnic reconciliation, peaceful political and economic transition, assistance to groups in extreme poverty; resettlement and reintegration of uprooted populations, repair of physical infrastructure, rebuilding of production systems, land reform or regulation of land tenure, rehabilitation through community or area development, etc.);

- in United Nations preventive development resource mobilization, propose UNDP programmatic activities which would be a major feature of the exercise;

- actively participate in the operations of a country's early-warning system, Disaster Management Training Programme (DMTP) workshops and follow-up and use of Special Programme Resources for disaster prevention and mitigation activities.

171. In providing policy and operational support to the UN Resident Coordinator and its country offices, UNDP Headquarters will:

- cooperate closely with DPA, DPKO and DHA and contribute to, or benefit from the United Nations political, diplomatic and other action which, together with special development initiatives, should contribute to the prevention of a disaster or an emergency;

- further develop, consolidate and streamline UNDP's capacity to assist countries and societies in crisis to prevent or mitigate emergencies and to mobilize resources for preventive development activities;

- further develop the concept of social vulnerabilities to man-made disasters and the methodology for their measurement;

- cooperate with DHA in further developing the Disaster Management Training Programme (DMTP), with a special emphasis on continuous national capacity building and multi-UN agencies participating;

- organize special workshops and on-the-job training in preventive and curative development and support to emergency relief operations for UNDP staff members at all levels including national staff;

- using early warning messages and other information, anticipate emergencies and place qualified Resident Coordinators in advance of complex emergencies and other crises and assist its country offices to preposition themselves for maximum response to emerging disasters; and

- in cooperation with JCGP, IASC, Bretton Woods institutions and other development partners, prepare draft guidelines for integrated preventive action for consideration by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

(iii) Operational activities: the case of PRODERE

172. UNDP is committed to the financing of short-term evaluations of institutional capacities and the need for upgrading existing knowledge and skills. Training, aimed at government departments, NGOs, community leaders and United Nations system personnel, will emphasize development efforts which can contribute to the avoidance of conflicts, mitigate natural disasters, lessen the duration of crises, and contribute to a rapid recovery and reconstruction process leading to sustainable human development.

173. The PRODERE ("Development programme for Displaced Persons Refugees & Returnees in Central America"), financed by UNDP as well as by one Member State, is an example of the UNDP efforts aimed at sustainable human development in crisis-prone or post-crisis (reconstruction) situations. The programme, in effect, is a source of experience and learning which could be applied mutatis mutandis to other regions of the world in addressing the root causes of conflicts. The "human development" model applied by PRODERE at the local level integrates aspects relating to human rights and better access to education and health services, as well as to the production system, thus making the programme a valuable method for conflict prevention. Not only does it attack the social and economic causes of violence and conflict, but it also trains and informs the population on their rights and the peaceful methods at their disposal for resolving disputes.

174. It is known that in several countries war and repression have had a highly destructive effect on the local decision-making structures. PRODERE in this regard emphasized the establishment and strengthening of participatory bodies for decision-making at the community, micro-regional, municipal and departmental levels. Such an approach is invaluable for the consequent democratic development of the societies concerned: it starts generating the organization and leadership required for participatory institutions and planning structures to function.

175. The PRODERE contribution to the cause of human rights in the Central American region would by itself justify its existence. The terror which a history of repression and political disintegration had instilled in the population, was progressively replaced by a climate of confidence suitable to a genuine state of law in the areas where PRODERE operated. But the most important impact proved to be an overall change in mental attitudes in these societies with regard to human rights. In many areas, PRODERE's presence broke the warring forces' institutional monopoly and contributed to making of human rights a concern and a need felt by the whole population.

176. One of the most successful aspects of PRODERE's strategy is its integrated and regional approach, in which national and local characteristics are taken into account. This approach has provided - on non-discriminatory terms - opportunities for participation as well as other benefits to the population of areas in which groups of refugees, returnees and displaced persons were settling. This non-discriminatory formula contributed to strengthen reconciliation processes.

177. Given its pilot and demonstrative nature, as well as the limitation of its resources as compared to the large number of uprooted persons in the region, a programme like PRODERE could not aspire to cover them all. This logically led to focus PRODERE activities in clearly defined areas, but this is justified by the fact that the concentration of resources made it possible to focus in greater depth on the neediest groups and individuals. Obviously, greater availability of human and material resources would have permitted broader coverage. This suggests that for future programmes efforts could be made to combine the contributions of a variety of donors and thus transcend the limitations of a pilot programme.

UNEP

178. It is the general philosophy of UNEP that the zero-sum competition over natural resources can be avoided by the use of non-judicial mechanisms for the resolution of environmental disputes and that, if these are based on the concepts of a "common good", i.e., the environment, which is the heritage of present and future generations, there is a better chance of reaching a "win-win" compromise by consensus. To this end, UNEP is engaged in facilitating this consensus building over a wide range of issues. These include the multilateral track of the Middle East Peace Process, various international waters both marine and freshwater, and in relation to a number of international conventions and protocols with which UNEP is closely associated. This work interfaces with that of the Environmental Law and Institutions Programme which deals with the complementary process of codifying or formalizing agreements to cooperate between governments which act as deterrent to future conflicts since most of the agreements contain mechanisms for dispute resolution and arbitration.

179. UNEP, jointly with UNCHS (Habitat), is engaged in a series of interventions within the rubric 'relief to development continuum'. While most of these interventions support and complement the activities of relief agencies in crisis situations (UNHCR, WFP, DHA etc), UNEP is frequently called upon to address the root causes of emergencies when there is an environmental link.

180. Closely connected with the above is the work which UNEP supports on 'environmental refugees', a growing and complex problem for the international community. UNEP is presently financing, in part, the production of a major report by the Climate Institute of Washington, D.C., and Green College, Oxford, entitled "Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena". UNEP's Desertification Programme is also finalizing a study on environmental refugees and UNEP Information Centre is producing an "International Source Guide to Refugee Camps and the Environment" due to be published in early 1996.

UNHCR

181. Traditionally UNHCR activities have been carried out in relatively peaceful environments. That scenario has now changed dramatically in a growing number of theatres with the proliferation of internal conflicts and escalation of population movements, and a much greater willingness on the part of the international community to address these problems within borders.

182. UNHCR has adopted a three-fold strategy in the field of conflict management, i.e. (a) early warning of conflict, (b) the interface between peace-keeping and humanitarian action, and (c) the post-conflict management. For the purposes of the present study the first dimension is of particular interest. In this regard, it may be mentioned that because of the latent instability and existence of numerous conflicts and flash points on the vast territory of the former Soviet Union, most early warning activities are carried out in this area. The Regional Bureau for Europe (RBE) and the Regional Bureau for South West Asia, North Africa and the Middle East (SWANAME) are interested in further developing already existing systems for monitoring situations in all regions of the former USSR for early detection of potential conflict and mass population displacement and facilitating early preventive action. UNHCR's Policy Advice Unit on the CIS and the Baltic States (PUCIS) and Centre for Documentation on Refugees (CDR) have been seeking to facilitate this as part of their work to provide comprehensive coverage and analysis of developments in the region.

183. Since other organizations already have, or would like to, set up networks for the timely and comprehensive monitoring of conflicts and tensions in the CIS and the Baltic States cooperative initiatives in this regard, offer potential advantages of avoiding duplications and cost-sharing. Therefore, UNHCR and various other organizations already draw on, among other information, the material made available by the Network on Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict, which is the largest functioning early warning network of its type dealing with this part of the world.

184. In the spring of 1995, UNHCR took the lead in convening a meeting in Moscow to discuss early warning and prevention work covering the countries of the former Soviet Union. The forum brought together for the first time most of the main organizations both inter-governmental and non-governmental which are active in, or interested in, this type of activity.

185. Among the various recommendations and decisions made by the participants of the meeting on early warning and prevention work was to create a task force to coordinate local and international efforts in this sphere. Through the meeting and its results, *UNHCR* hopes to have made a further significant contribution to conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts in the region of the former Soviet Union. UNHCR remains aware though that theoretical interest in early warning work has still to be translated into financial support.

186. As a novel undertaking and at the request of the General Assembly, UNHCR has taken the lead in organizing - jointly with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE - a regional conference on the problems of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of involuntary displacement and returnees in countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and relevant neighbouring States. Through a series of meetings in the CIS region and at Geneva, a comprehensive strategy is being devised that would assist affected countries to address different types of existing involuntary displacements of populations, whatever their causes, and to actively prevent any further such movements of people. The process is therefore solutions-oriented and preventive in nature. It is followed and supported by a large number of interested governments, inter-governmental organizations, including regional ones, as well as non-governmental organizations and independent actors.

187. It is expected that the conference will be held in 1996 and will adopt a programme of action involving all groups of countries and organizations in a principled, multi-year strategy to stabilize involuntary population movements, addressing whenever possible root-causes from a non-political perspective. In view of its unprecedented character, the process leading to the convening of this CIS Conference is a test of the ability of the United Nations and of UNHCR in particular to develop, jointly with other organizations, containment, stabilizing and prevention strategies through the humanitarian angle but with adequate political and developmental support. It could set a model for similar future regional humanitarian preventive diplomacy endeavours.

WFP

188. The WFP reports that it makes an important contribution to prevention of possible conflicts in the future. Since the basic assumption is that conflict arises as a result of inequity in access to, and distribution of, assets and wealth among the world's population, through provision of support to those groups of population who are poor and disadvantaged, these disparities may be corrected and causes for conflict eliminated.

189. Besides, WFP contributes to the United Nations system through the organs that have specifically been created to deal with these issues: primarily DHA and, as required, through DPKO and DPA. As a result, WFP participates in the Joint Early Warning initiatives in the United Nations system such as the ACC Inter-Agency Consultation on Early Warning and Net Flows of Refugees and Displaced Persons and the meetings of DHA's Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS). Both of these initiatives are still in a developmental stage. Moreover, by its participation in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and its Working Group, both under the direction of DHA, WFP's Executive Director and its staff contribute to discussions which could be classified as preventive diplomacy when the budding crisis situations are reviewed and action is decided upon. WFP as a Programme is well placed to provide advice and information through its network of weekly emergency telexes and contributes, through the Resident Coordinators'

system, to information exchange that allows identification of crises and their possible resolution.

190. The WFP has significant experience in providing food aid in conflict or post-conflict situations. Within the context of preventive or pre-conflict peace-building transition should be encouraged from food aid to reliance on domestic food production. This transition can and should be encouraged through provision of: (a) food assistance during an interim period between the end of conflict and resumption of agricultural production/attainment of self-sufficiency in basic food commodities; (b) essential inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides; and (c) technical assistance and credit. The United Nations system, mainly FAO and IFAD, can play an important role in providing and facilitating both.

(b) United Nations specialized agencies

FAO

191. The contribution of FAO to conflict prevention lies mainly in the field of early warning. The Organization's Global Information and Early Warning System constantly monitors the crop and food supply situation and alerts the international community to potential crisis due to food shortages. FAO also participates actively in the ACC established group on Consultations on Early Warning on New Flows of Refugees and Displaced Persons and in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on humanitarian assistance.

192. The FAO considers that the strengthening of national capacities through technical cooperation and support of national and regional development programmes are also essential pre-requisites for conflict prevention and mitigation. As many conflicts, both within and amongst countries, reflect an underlying crisis in development faced by many developing countries, the advice and development assistance provided by the Organization through the regular budget or through extra-budgetary resources contributes to address the root causes of conflicts and thereby to reduce the risk of conflicts arising.

IAEA

193. In the area of conflict prevention and management, the IAEA plays an important role in verifying compliance by States with their non-proliferation obligations. Currently, States who are party to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) with the IAEA rely on safeguards for assurance of compliance by other States with their non-proliferation obligations. The objectives of comprehensive safeguards are: (a) to assure the international community that a State party to a CSA is complying with its peaceful use undertakings; and (b) to deter, through the risk of early detection, the diversion from peaceful use (or the misuse) of nuclear materials and facilities. The international community looks to safeguards for assurance that these objectives have been met with regard to both declared nuclear facilities, and for assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.

194. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a Cut-Off Agreement, and other prospective nuclear arms control and disarmament accords will all require effective and credible verification systems. The more that nuclear weapons are reduced, the more States will need to be confident that commitments are being observed and respected. Thus, effective verification is, and will remain, a vital means of further confidence building, which in turn contributes to conflict prevention and management. The IAEA is already involved in

applying safeguards to large amounts of nuclear material which have been deemed surplus to the weapons programmes of certain member states, and stands ready to provide similar verification in other Nuclear Weapons States. Indeed the NPT Extension Conference recommended that nuclear material released from military use should be placed under *IAEA* safeguards as soon as practicable.

195. In any event, the IAEA's ability to live up to the expectations placed on its safeguards system as a means to increase confidence and to contribute to the prevention and management of conflicts will depend on the extent to which Member States are prepared to grant it the necessary authority, resources and political support.

IMO

196. The IMO also reports that by facilitating and promoting the establishment or enhancement of safe and environmentally sound maritime and port services, which are a fundamental condition for stable economic development, the activities of IMO contribute to the prevention of conflict.

UNESCO

197. Education is at the heart of any strategy for peace-building. It is through education that the broadest possible introduction can be provided to the values, skills and knowledge which form the basis of respect for human rights and democratic principles, the rejection of violence and a spirit of tolerance, understanding and mutual appreciation among individuals, groups and nations.

198. Over the last two years, the international community has endowed itself with a very comprehensive framework of reference and action, which will guide UNESCO's work throughout the duration of the Medium Term Strategy and which includes: the World Plan of Action on Education for Human Rights and Democracy (Montreal, 1993); the Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), which make reference to the Montreal Plan of Action; the Declaration on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy adopted by the International Conference on Education (Geneva, 1994) and the Integrated Framework of Action; and lastly the Plan of Action of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995-2005), which the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its forty-ninth session. The General Assembly stressed the special responsibility incumbent upon UNESCO in implementing this Plan, assigning the Organization, jointly with HCHR/CHR an important role in the design, implementation and evaluation of projects under this Plan.

199. The Medium-Term Plan of UNESCO for 1996 - 2001 focuses on two sets of strategies: those which will contribute to development and the strategies that will contribute to peace-building, advancing the cause of peace. By means of the strategies concerning peace-building, UNESCO will devote its peace-building action to education for peace, human rights, democracy, tolerance and international understanding, as well as promoting the fight against discrimination, the consolidation of democratic processes and practices, the free flow of information, cultural pluralism and strengthened dialogue among cultures.

200. Educational actions contributing to conflict prevention and peaceful conflict resolution will be part and parcel of UNESCO strategies which will be developed during the 1996-1997 biennium along the following main lines: (a) promotion of educational policies, plans and programmes on education for peace, human rights and democracy; (b) elaboration of manuals, textbooks and teaching aids, in particular on conflict prevention, non-violence, and peaceful conflict resolution; (c) reinforcement of networks of institutions active in education for peace, human rights and democracy, in particular by extending the Associated Schools Project, UNESCO Chairs and enhancing contribution of the Organization to promoting tolerance, non-violence and peaceful conflict resolution through education.

201. The long-term goal that UNESCO has set itself is the establishment of a comprehensive system of education and training for peace, human rights and democracy that is intended for all groups of people and embraces all levels of education, whether formal or non-formal. The Organization's strategy will consist in mobilizing both individuals and Institutions (governments, educators, the media, families, parliaments, businesses, trades unions, NGOs, etc.). UNESCO will reinforce its struggle against violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of intellectuals, writers, educators, journalists, scientists, artists, etc. The Organization will gather in cooperation with its partners information with a view to rallying public opinion worldwide on these matters for protecting the intellectuals from attacks on their lives, dignity and freedom of expression.

202. UNESCO is implementing the Culture of Peace Programme which is the Organization's way of coordinating its response, within the fields of its competence, to the challenge of the Agenda for Peace. It was formally established in February 1994, with the following responsibilities: (a) coordination of the many activities of UNESCO in education, culture, science, communication, social science and youth and women's programmes which contribute to a culture of peace; (b) establishment of national culture of peace programme in countries which are emerging from conflict situation as well as in those where the potential for conflict is real; (c) development of a network and information system to link the many other organizations involved in similar efforts.

203. Networking and the two-way flow of information between all the Programme's partners - present and potential - is at the heart of the Culture of Peace Programme. Besides, UNESCO already acts at the field level thanks to its national programmes. The primary goal of national programmes is to provide a setting in which players from all sides of the conflict can sit around the same table, to design human development projects from which all people in the country - and region - will benefit. Programmes are carried out in cooperating with UNESCO's field offices and National Commissions, NGOs and other members of the United Nations family.

204. In all cases, national programmes are set up at the invitation of the host country and activities are built on initiatives that already exist. Committees are formed, made up of official representatives as well as other members of the civil society. The culture of Peace Programme assists in the development of the programme and facilitates the involvement of all parties. So far, national programmes are already under way in El Salvador and Mozambique, and others are being planned in Burundi and the Congo. In the Philippines, UNESCO is cooperating with a culture of peace programme that was already under way. Requests from many other countries have been received by the Programme, including Guatemala and Nicaragua.

205. During the next medium-term period and, in particular the 1996-1997 biennium, the strategies of the Organization will, inter alia, be aimed at the implementation of the Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy. In their declaration at the 1994 International Conference on Education, the Ministers of Education committed themselves, in particular, to strive resolutely "to pay special attention to educating caring and responsible citizens, open to other cultures, able to appreciate the value of freedom, respectful of human dignity and differences, and able to prevent conflicts or resolve them by non-violent means".[90] The objectives, strategies and action lines of the Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy are also aimed at developing through education the abilities, values, knowledge and behavioural patterns providing the necessary basis for prevention of conflicts and peaceful conflict resolution.[91]

WHO

206. WHO recognizes that the root causes of today's internal and cross-border conflicts are closely related to the failure of the global development process; inequality and uneven allocation of resources both within and between countries exacerbate ethnical, religious and cultural tensions which often lead to open conflict. Its "World Health Report 1995 - Bridging the Gaps" highlights the intrinsic interrelation between poverty alleviation and the improvement of health status. In this broad perspective, the range of WHO activities that have conflict prevention value is quite extensive.

207. For example, the activities of the Division of Family Health on women and children in conflict and pre-conflict situations as well as WHO's collaboration with and contribution to United Nations Human Rights activities in Rwanda, Bosnia, etc., are of relevance to such activities. WHO supports the United Nations strategy for Sustainable Human Development which focuses on poverty alleviation, the full integration of socially excluded groups into the socio-economic process, rational use of environmental resources and the protection of human rights, which include the right to health. As to the need to prevent the return of conflicts in post-war periods, the Division of Emergency and Humanitarian Action has offered many contributions related to this dimension of the problem. Many of WHO's country activities in conflict situations have a "built-in" conflict reduction value. They not only emphasize a return to normalcy, but also facilitate contacts between belligerent groups on neutral health issues, thereby creating first tenuous bridges towards peace.

WMO

208. With the links between conflict and famine, and between conflict and the adequate sharing of a common supply of water (para. 142), WMO plays an important role towards mitigating the impact by providing an early warning through its long-range seasonal and annual predictions of drought conditions that have an effect in both situations. For example, scientists are now able to predict a year in advance, drought conditions in Africa or Asia as a result of special conditions in the tropical Pacific Ocean known as "El Nino", thereby allowing the countries concerned to plan appropriate measures to lessen the impact and avoid conflict.

209. WMO provides effective support for the International Convention to Combat Desertification which will have an impact on critical issues as food and water supplies, and on cross border migration. In relation to the supply of water, WMO, with the support of the World Bank, launched the World Hydrological Cycle Observing System (WHYCOS) to address the growing concerns about the lack of accessible information on the scarcity of freshwater resources and their sustainability in many parts of the globe.

(c) Multilateral financial institutions

210. The role of the multilateral financial institutions in preventing conflicts and mitigating consequences thereof is seen, firstly, through improvement of early warning systems so that the international community can act more quickly to prevent or handle financial shocks. In the view of the participants of the Halifax Summit, such a system should include improved and effective surveillance of national economic policies and financial market developments, and fuller disclosure of this information to market participants.

211. Secondly, the Bretton Woods institutions, in their view, have a particular role in promoting macroeconomic stability, in supporting favourable environments for sustainable development and in mobilizing and transferring resources for development. An important development in this regard is the trend, which importance has been emphasized by both developed and developing countries, towards enhancing the cooperation between the Bretton Woods institutions and other organizations of the United Nations system in the areas of social development, environment and poverty elimination. The operational activities of the World Bank are now more focused on poverty elimination and increasing lending to the social sectors. UNDP and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cooperate in the area of capacity-building.[92] It may also be added that the World Bank involvement in technical cooperation activities has steadily increased over the years and, in 1993, amounted to a total of US$ 3.1 billion, of which free-standing loans constituted US$ 646 million, rising from US$ 47 million to US$ 66 million in 1993. As an executing agency of UNDP, World Bank supported technical cooperation increased from US$ 56 million in 1989 to US$ 64 million in 1993.[93]

212. In Halifax, G-7 countries, in particular, committed themselves to work with the organizations and all their members to ensure that the relevant multilateral institutions make sustainable development a central goal of their policies and programs.

E. Financing of pre-conflict peace-building

213. Financing is unquestionably a most critical element of and constraint on pre-conflict peace-building. One of the challenges would be to persuade the international Community to make contributions for financing this activity when the immediate danger of complex humanitarian disaster is not yet evident. In this connection, it may be mentioned that, in 1994, the rate of response to 14 consolidated inter-agency humanitarian appeals equalled 77 per cent of requirements. As mentioned elsewhere in the present report, the international community should realize that the cost of pre-conflict peace-building is but a fraction of what may total future expenditures of peace-keeping operations and, eventually, post-conflict peace-building. The United Nations can play a catalytic role in convincing donors of the critical importance on pre-conflict peace-building for safeguarding international peace and security.

V. TOWARDS UNIVERSAL COOPERATION FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

214. Enhancement of the capacity for effective action to prevent crises should be based on the complementary and synergetic roles of all the actors, including the United Nations, as a catalyst, regional and subregional organizations and NGOs. All these organizations, possessing varying capacities for conducting preventive action, potentially have important roles to play. In this connection, ONUMOZ may serve an example where this cooperation, although in a different context, has worked perfectly well. An extremely able and activist Secretary-General's special representative was supported by a well organized and tightly coordinated donor community willing to apply leverage at key points, by intense diplomatic activity on the scene by a handful of influential countries with longstanding relations with the parties, and by a strong and supportive NGO community.

A. Regional and sub-regional organizations

215. Recently, the international community has sought to devolve more responsibility for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace-keeping to regional and subregional organizations. The United Nations, with the support of the Security Council and General Assembly, has been pursuing more effective cooperation with regional organizations in accordance with the concepts embodied in Chapter VIII of the Charter. The Security Council recognized that the responsibilities and capacities of different regional organizations and arrangements vary, as well as the readiness and competence of regional organizations and arrangements, as reflected in their charters and other relevant documents, to participate in efforts to maintain international peace and security.

216. The Secretary-General has offered, in his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, to help such organizations and arrangements develop a capacity for preventive action, peacemaking and, where appropriate, peace-keeping. The Security Council's statement in response on 22 February 1995 welcomed this offer and called for particular attention to be given to the needs of Africa. It encouraged practical cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations. In view of some Member States, the complementarity of the respective roles of the United Nations and regional organizations in conflict management and resolution needs new emphasis. The thrust of the regional organizations, in their opinion, should be directed to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, while peace-keeping and peace enforcement should remain the primary responsibility of the United Nations.

217. In the last two-three years, some regional and subregional organizations have expressed commitment to do more to address conflicts on their continents and have established new institutional mechanisms to promote conciliation and negotiation. These initiatives complement global efforts in the field of conflict prevention and augur well for future cooperation between these organizations and the rest of international community.

218. Some mechanisms for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations are already in place. A number of regional organizations, including the OAS, OAU, OIC, SELA and Arab League, have standing invitations to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly. Most of these organizations have formal framework agreements for cooperation with the United Nations, although these framework agreements, while prescribing principles for cooperation, do not always provide concrete mechanisms to achieve it. One exception is the CSCE (renamed as OSCE in

December 1994), which declared itself in July 1992 to be a regional arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII. Despite these agreements, there are relatively few instances of practical cooperation on the ground between the United Nations and regional organizations in preventive approaches. The most important point is that any cooperative arrangement between the United Nations and regional organizations must be sufficiently adaptable to meet each situation as it arises.[94]

(a) Capacities and activities

219. In Europe, contribution of **OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)** to conflict prevention and crisis management has become an integral part of the process of OSCE's functional redefinition and institutional development. With the landmark decision of the 1990 "Charter of Paris" and the 1992 Helsinki document, OSCE had to embark on a transition from its role as a forum for negotiation and dialogue to an active operational structure. **Early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management** have become main features of the new OSCE, but it is early warning and conflict prevention which have been given the greatest emphasis.

220. One readily available instrument of **early warning**, foreseen in the 1992 Helsinki Document, is the intensive use of regular, in-depth political consultations, within the structure and institutions of the OSCE. Their possibilities were significantly expanded with the establishment, as of December 1993, of a new body - the Permanent Committee. Open dialogue in the Committee can help to ease emerging tensions, clarify misperceptions and prompt more forthcoming approaches. An example in point, is a regular exchange of views on the situation in the Baltic States. Another early warning instrument can ben seen in the **regular implementation debates** within OSCE framework. The participating states collectively examine how agreed principles, norms and commitments are being implemented in daily practice. Ongoing violations of commitments are often the sign of the beginning of a conflict. The OSCE conducts this kind of comprehensive examination once every two years.

221. The third instrument is **long-term missions**. In addition to encouraging dialogue between the authorities and local communities and promoting confidence-building at the local level, these missions monitor developments that may have potentially dangerous implications. OSCE considers that it has made a real contribution to calming down situation in places where its missions were active and that it has certainly helped to diffuse tensions in the Baltic region.

222. OSCE - developed **confidence and security-building measures** (CSBMs) can also serve as an early warning indicator. The failure of Yugoslavia to submit its military data in December 1991 was a signal suggesting a serious regrouping of forces for potentially aggressive purposes. Furthermore, the annual reviews of the implementation of CSBMs can provide an opportunity for discussing potential crisis implications of military developments in the participating states. CSBMs are subject to constant improvement in order to increase their early warning quality and, in particular, their applicability to inter-state conflicts.

223. The **OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities** also has a specific and explicit early warning function. According to his mandate, he "will provide early warning at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues that have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgement of the High

Commissioner, have the potential to develop into conflict within the OSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating states".[95]

224. In addition, to mechanisms, joint political decisions and independent action by officials in the context of conflict prevention, the OSCE has developed several other instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes such as the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, Directed Conciliation procedures under which the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials may direct two participating states to seek conciliation. However, to date none of these procedures has been used by the participating states.

225. The OSCE is determined to develop its conflict prevention potential, a policy which was backed by ministers at the OSCE Council Meeting in Rome in December 1993. Furthermore, the support for the OSCE at the NATO Summit in January 1994 undoubtedly provides a fresh political impulse for the dynamic development of OSCE capabilities. As stated in their Declaration, the NATO Allies "remain deeply committed to further strengthening the OSCE, which is the only organization comprising all European and North American countries, as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, cooperative security and the advancement of democracy and human rights". They "support the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the OSCE for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management".

226. In **Africa**, some regional and sub-regional organizations have recently embarked on initiatives to resolve conflict on the continent and thus aid United Nations peace promotion activities. The **Organization of African Unity** (OAU), the **League of Arab States** (LAS) and the **Organization of the Islamic Conference** (OIC) cooperated directly with the United Nations in negotiations with the Somali parties and in establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia. The OAU, which conflict management role is already being strengthened, sent observer missions to South Africa during its transition to democracy (in conjunction with United Nations, European Union, and Commonwealth teams) and now has missions deployed in Mozambique and Burundi.

227. The **OAU's** Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, and Resolution of Conflict, established after the Cairo summit in 1994, is an example of efforts to create new institutions to bolster regional capacities.[96] It will be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter, in particular, the sovereign equality of Member States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the inviolability of borders of the African states inherited from colonialism. The primary objective of the African Mechanism is the anticipation and prevention of conflicts recurrence in circumstances where conflicts have occurred. It will be its responsibility to undertake peacemaking and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed. Prompt and decisive action in these spheres would assist in preventing the emergence of conflicts, and where they do inevitably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or generalized conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures and concerted action in peacemaking and peace-building would obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping operations.

228. Close cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU is of particular importance, and steps can be taken to enhance that relationship and improve communications between the two organizations at all levels. Following the adoption by the OAU in 1993 of the Conflict Prevention Mechanism, discussion continues both in New York and in Africa on ways and means of improving practical cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations and arrangements, particularly in Africa. In this regard, it may be mentioned that the OAU, which has a mandate from its members to work on conflict prevention, early-warning, mediation, and low cost observing and monitoring conflict and cease-fire situations, has established a Peace Fund to finance improvements in its interventions for conflict resolution and management. The Secretary-General, in his report to the High-Level Segment of ECOSOC in July 1995 entitled "Special Initiative for Africa," proposed that a Trust Fund, to be managed by UNDP, be established to collect resources to support the OAU's peace-building efforts. It is envisioned that the Peace Fund will be established on an endowment basis to give absolute assurance of the continuity of fund contributions to the OAU. The preliminary estimate of a meaningful endowment would be US$100 million to be contributed over a five-year period.

229. A layered approach would suggest that resorting to a regional organization is not necessarily a first or best step. For example, it was **Economic Community of Western African States** (ECOWAS) who deployed a peace-keeping mission to restore order and promote negotiations in Liberia. Likewise, activities of the **Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development** (IGADD), to promote peace between Ethiopia and Somalia and among the warring factions in Sudan is an example of the comparative advantage of subregional organizations. The **Southern African Development Commission** (SADC) could play a similar role with regard to conflicts in that subregion.

230. In **Asia**, the **Association of Southeast Asian Nations** (ASEAN) and individual States from several other regions worked together with the four Parties in Cambodia to reach an agreement on how to settle Cambodia's civil war. The negotiations culminated in the signing of a peace accord in Paris in 1991 that mandated the United Nations to oversee that free and fair elections. While Governments from every region contributed personnel to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), ASEAN nations and neighbouring States assumed the lion's share of responsibility for providing the necessary 16,000 Blue Helmets and 3,600 civilian police.

231. At the **ASEAN Regional Forum**, held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994, the agreement was reached to study a series of proposals for cooperative security and confidence-building measures in application of the principle of "TRANSPARENCY" all of which are tailored to fit with the specific regional requirement of that subregion. Such proposals are considered to be as means of early-warning and confidence building in the framework of conflict prevention.

232. In Latin America, two regional organizations - **OAS and SELA** - are enhancing their capacity for conflict prevention. The amendments to the OAS Charter adopted by its General Assembly in December 1985, gave greater powers of meditation to the Permanent Council by allowing it to "resolve a dispute between members, whether or not all the parties concerned had (as previously stipulated) agreed to take the matter before the OAS". In its 1991 Santiago Declarations, the Organization of American States declared that violations of basic democratic norms, such as a military coup, affected regional stability and would trigger a collective response if Member States considered the problem sufficiently serious. The amendments also increased the executive powers of the OAS

Secretary-General by allowing him to "take the initiative in bringing before the Permanent Council matters that might threaten the peace and security of the hemisphere or the development of the Member States, something which previously only a member country had permitted to do.[97]

233. The OAS General Assembly, in its resolution AG/RES 1180 (XXII-0/92) of 23 May 1992, instructed the Permanent Council to establish a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security to continue consideration of the special committees which may contribute to the maintenance of peace and security, for example, the Special Committee to Monitor Compliance with the Trade Embargo on Haiti. The OAS convenes an ad hoc meeting of ministers of foreign affairs whenever needs arise. Such a meeting was convened in May 1993, to discuss the situation in Guatemala and the OAS Secretary-General was requested to send a fact-finding mission.[98]

234. **SELA** (Latin American Economic System) which was created in 1975 as a consequence of an emptiness in the structure of internal relations within Latin America and Caribbean, where no regional organizations existed that permitted all countries of the region to discuss and take decisions in concert with and in defense of the economic and social interests of the countries concerned, over the last several years has become more interested in the matters of ensuring peace and stability in the region. In 1986, in response to the collective needs of an anxious region to find its own identity, SELA extended its mandate by a decision of its members to include political questions, offering all countries in the region a forum to discuss and solve those problems that could degenerate into grave conflict. Cooperation with SELA which enjoys the status of a permanent observer to the United Nations since its inception has been an item of the General Assembly agenda for a number of years.

(b) Developing further cooperation

235. Better coordination of the efforts by the United Nations and regional/sub-regional organizations is essential. For the moment it is often ad hoc. Greater coordination and consultation would come in part through enhanced contacts between the organizations, both between their representatives in the field, particularly at working level, and between their headquarters. A first step would be for the Secretariats of the organizations to meet and determine their priorities for cooperation. A staff exchange programme - and even liaison offices in the organizations' headquarters - might be established. Consideration could be given to combined diplomatic efforts of the United Nations and regional/sub-regional organizations, including joint missions.

236. Cooperation of the United Nations and regional/subregional organizations in the area of conflict prevention can take a variety of forms. For instance, to allow for coordination and cooperation, the **OSCE** has already been informing the United Nations about all its activities, in particular its missions. United Nations officials are often present at the regional organizations' meetings (OSCE, OAU...) at which conflict situations are discussed. Regional organizations' missions in New York are in constant contact with the United Nations Secretary-General and the United Nations Security Council.

237. The regional organizations and the United Nations could share more of their early warning information, both on the ground - between their field representatives - and between their headquarters. The organizations involved also need an enhanced flow of relevant information from their members as problems first surface and then become acute. Consideration might be given to ways of doing this electronically.

238. The United Nations might also be able to provide regional organizations with technical assistance, including staff exchanges. Thus the **OAU**, for example, badly needs assistance for staff training and infrastructure to maintain an ongoing capacity to act swiftly on warnings or in crises. Through direct support and by marshalling the support of other potential donors, the United Nations can help institutionalize the OAU initiative. The Peace Fund for contributions to the OAU initiative may prove to be an appropriate and innovative instrument for pooling the resources of various contributors. Funding from donor states would be another useful source of assistance.

239. In the area of preventive diplomacy a very practical and often practised form of cooperation is cross-participation in missions, especially in those of a fact-finding nature, and mutual participation in meetings and seminars on conceptual and practical aspects of conflict management. The **OSCE** has cooperated in this manner with the Council of Europe and UNHCR. The cooperation with UNHCR started with missions to Armenia/Azerbaijan in 1992 and included, among others, an OSCE observer role (1994) in the context of negotiation concerning Abkhazia (Georgia), as well as ongoing contacts with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. However, better organized and more effective coordination and cooperation between international organizations is essential if the credibility of international action is to be re-established.

240. Actually, it has to be recognized that the experience of regional organizations in conflict prevention is still limited, but certain comparative advantages have begun to manifest themselves. The **OAU** has certain comparative advantage in preventive diplomacy, based on the Conflict Prevention Mechanism. This mechanism remains under-resourced, however, and one priority should be to consider how it could be further strengthened with help from both within Africa and outside as appropriate. African states could also be encouraged to make clear their willingness to make the fullest use of preventive action, along the lines suggested on 22 February 1995, by the Security Council President.

241. **OSCE's** comparative advantage is that it can legitimize in a political sense international measures and actions. This capacity is based mainly on the OSCE's comprehensive membership. All states in the Vancouver-to-Vladivostok area are OSCE participating states on a basis of equality. The political value of a OSCE decision is strengthened by the consensus rule which legitimizes the decision and makes it more difficult for states to dissociate themselves from a decision once it has been taken. Moreover, based on a comprehensive concept of security, which explicitly links the maintenance of security and stability to the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the OSCE can get to the root causes of tension and apply comprehensive treatment at an early stage. Furthermore, the OSCE also has a clear mandate to deal with crises within states.

242. By way of concluding, it should be emphasized that mutual cooperation should allow each of the international organizations to preserve its own area of action and responsibility. While avoiding duplication of work, thereby saving resources and ensuring better cost-effectiveness.

B. Non-governmental organizations

243. The 1990s witnessed not only a rapid growth of NGOs around the world but also their increasingly active involvement in international affairs. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) stands as a watershed event since it legitimized NGOs as vital players in the environment and development dialogue and marked a turning point in their efforts to become part of international policy-making. Many NGOs felt that their international "movement" had finally been recognized, and that NGOs had landed squarely on the political playing field.[99] This trend continued at the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in September 1994, the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen in March 1995, the World Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995. NGOs activities encompass not only the promotion of human rights, development aid and environmental actions but also cooperation with the various phases of the peace process, i.e. early warning, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace building.

244. The comparative advantages of NGOs are well-known. Firstly, they possess a considerable hard-earned experience in carrying out the strategies, programmes and projects, especially at the grass-root level. Secondly, they also have enormous expertise in organizing and implementing humanitarian relief operations in which they, though sporadically, have been involved for over 200 years! It may also be added that NGOs have been heavily involved, sometimes at great danger to themselves, in setting standards and promoting, protecting, teaching, and helping to strengthen human rights infrastructures around the world. Thirdly, NGOs are able to cross traditional political, religious and culture boundaries. Fourthly, NGOs can provide a quick and flexible response.

245. Being innovative and pioneering, NGOs with grass-roots knowledge of psychological dimensions of conflicts may be able to play a very important role in heading-off conflicts. The cooperation of local NGOs who have the know-how for conflict resolution based on traditional culture and wisdom may prove to be very useful for mediation and reconciliation. Academic community, research institutes and think tanks can provide early warning based on empirical studies and future research of the evolving situations.

246. Although NGOs have been only marginally involved in the United Nations peace-keeping missions, their representatives assisted in special observer, election, referenda and monitoring and supporting activities. The Secretary-General, in his statement to the Inter-agency Meeting held 10 April 1993 in Bangkok, called for further cooperation with NGOs. He also recognized that they had played a very important role in some regions. "They (NGOs) were more important in Somalia than the agencies of the United Nations. When the agencies of the United Nations were afraid of the situation, the NGOs were already on the ground and did a wonderful job"[100].

247. In her keynote address to the Partnership in Action (PARINAC) Global Conference held in Oslo in June 1994, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stressed the importance of the action of non-governmental organizations in the area of prevention. The High Commissioner further emphasized the importance of consultation between UNHCR and non-governmental organizations in regard to emergency response and the question of prevention was also the subject of a special section in the Plan of Action adopted by the Oslo Conference.

248. Recommendation 33 of the Conference adopted under the heading of "Prevention" stated the following:

> "UNHCR and NGOs should establish effective early warning systems through which they can share essential information on root causes and on areas of prospective refugee flows, as a way of contributing to early conflict resolution and promoting peace-keeping and peace-building efforts., UNHCR should provide NGOs, especially local NGOs, with information on existing databases and information systems such as the International Refugee Electronics Network (IRENE). NGOs should be trained on collection, analysis and dissemination of early warning information and the use of such networking systems, with a view to improving early warning mechanisms. NGOs should share early warning information directly with UNHCR to avoid compromising their activities in areas of prospective refugee movements and to ensure confidentiality".

249. The role of NGOs in conflict prevention cannot be over-emphasized. In fact, "in addition to traditional NGOs associated with the peace process, e.g. **International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement***, there are in the world today a large number of NGOs working for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, including **International Alert, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, and Médecins Sans Frontières.**"[101] They are certainly very useful source of information to give an early warning signal. But more important is that their ability to cut across traditional political, religious and cultural boundaries make them indispensable as partners in dealing with intra-state conflicts at their various stages. NGOs can also play an important role in actually intervening in conflict situations, often at an unofficial level, to ease tensions or provide mediation and facilitating functions.

250. Moreover, NGOs, for instance, may help the United Nations to avoid unnecessary expenditures, related to deployment of mission. They could be very helpful (upon request), in particular, in determining logistics in the countries concerned. Being in close touch, and, hence, an effective channel of communication, with the local population, having first-hand knowledge of the security situation in the countries concerned, NGOs could be involved in planning United Nations involvement.

251. The example of **the International Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement** which, over the years, has developed a more activist view of its role in conflict prevention suggests what certain NGOs can do in this area. While a conflict is still at a political or incipient stage, the National Red Cross or Red Crescent Society might offer to undertake the role of a peacetime neutral intermediary, or might call on a specially constituted International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies team, to attempt to moderate a

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*Although, because of its special statute, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement does not strictly belong to the NGO category, it is placed here for practical reasons.

process of conflict prevention and resolution.[102] Other less direct involvements in conflict prevention are already possible for Red Cross national societies. They can work to privately influence the leadership of groups whose differences may provoke a conflict to resolve their differences peacefully in the interest of the well-being of the people and of the nation's own long-term economic and social health.

252. The International Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement throughout much of its early history considered that the prevention of conflict was largely a concern of states and peoples to which the Movement, through its compassionate service activities, was able to contribute in the long-run by cultivating the attitudes of peacefulness and international cooperation. A more activist view of the Red Cross/Red Crescent role in conflict prevention has gradually built up during the present century, particularly since the century's middle years, when peace became a key topic on the Movement's conference and dialogue agendas.[103]

253. National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies as part of normal, peacetime activities can establish and conduct activities that tend to diminish and prevent social conflict. They can develop and operate a program in teaching skills of conflict prevention, mediation and resolution for individuals and groups. Particularly, they can establish service and education programs that tend to improve the situation of minorities among a country's population; problems surrounding minorities are a frequent source of civil tension, and the minority populations themselves are frequently a country's poorest and most vulnerable people, in itself a source of social tension.

254. Another initiative in the area of conflict prevention initiative of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is to work as a federation to bring peace-promoting views to the world's governments and intergovernmental bodies. The Federation's limited ability to introduce its views and experience into the dialogue and processes of the international intergovernmental community could be significantly enhanced by national societies' lending skilled diplomatic and intergovernmental representatives to the Federation.

255. The establishment of **International Alert** (IA) in 1985 was rooted in the recognition of the gaps in the international system, which inhibit addressing the root causes of internal violence and combatting their consequences. As a small agency, it has focused on the need for early warning and conflict prevention and has worked in partnership with others in addressing conflicts in specific countries and situations. The IA is actively engaged in developing training programmes to empower individuals by providing them with skills in conflict transformation. It is also active in many regions and countries, which include parts of Africa, the states and republics of the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and the South Pacific. IA is also involved in thematic programmes which address issues such as minority rights, networking and citizen-based peacemaking throughout the world, in addition to issues of early warning and preventive diplomacy. As a matter of policy, IA collaborates with local and regional organizations and seeks to empower these partners through its country-specific and thematic initiatives.

256. Another example is **South African NGOs**. They were active in resolving conflict during that country's turbulent transition. Given their experience, some have suggested that the surplus capacity of conflict resolution professionals in South Africa could be used to help diminish conflicts in other parts of Africa.

257. The capacity of labour unions and business associations, universities, think tanks, development bodies, and other sectors of civil society should be bolstered with a view to developing these organizations as potential conflict resolvers. It is beyond dispute that changes in the methods and modes of future relationship between NGOs and the United Nations are necessary.

258. The 1993 JIU report on United Nations system work with NGOs at the national and grassroots levels[104] noted the many types of interaction and cooperation which are developing worldwide between the system organizations and NGOs in operational programmes, and the benefits that this collaboration can provide for more effective and efficient operational activities for development. It also noted that while many System agencies and organizations have expanded their collaborative work with NGOs in recent years, the organization which has the most wide-ranging areas of interaction with NGOs - the United Nations - had not yet inventoried and organized its collective work. Therefore, JIU recommended that "the Secretary-General ... should formulate an overall policy and framework for the many United Nations programmes which work with NGOs" (Recommendation 6).

259. As noted in another recent JIU study on the advancement of women[105], no remedial action has been taken in the United Nations Secretariat with regard to enhancing collaboration with NGOs. Therefore, in the same report JIU repeated the necessity of elaborating an overall policy and framework of working with NGOs based on the principles of subsidiarity, division of labour, and genuine partnership. Involvement of NGOs in the United Nations activities related to conflict prevention should be their integral part.

260. The Inspectors believe that the work of NGOs in intervening to resolve disputes could be improved, development of their capacity to provide policy-relevant information and analysis should be welcomed. Every encouragement should be given to increased participation by NGOs in accordance with the two relevant principles, namely, the subsidiary principle that the problem needs to be dealt with at the most appropriate level and the principle of division of labour based on comparative advantage.[106]

261. It would, in particular, be desirable for non-governmental organizations which are active in a given country - or have special experience of the problems existing in a particular country or area - to be included in consultative arrangements for coordinated preventive action carried out by the United Nations, regional or sub-regional organizations and other actors. It is also important to establish appropriate consultative arrangements among non-governmental organizations themselves, operating in a particular country or area. Experience has indeed shown that the multi-presence of non-governmental agencies and their uncoordinated action can lead to confusion and correspondingly ineffective results.

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31. Document A/50/230, op. cit., para. 13, p. 4.

32. JIU/REP/95/6, A/50/572, op. cit., pp. 3-5.

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34. "UNESCO's post-conflict peace-building national programmes, for example, incorporate concertation and the peaceful management of differences and conflicts in the heart of their projects. From the design and elaboration of the project, right through its implementation, every decision has to be taken by consensus among former enemies. If during war, the management of conflicts was violent, in a post-war period the challenge lies in re-learning to dialogue, negotiate and handle conflicts in a constructive way."

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45. Resolution 47/120, VII, preamble paragraph.

46. Well over 400 of its more than 1.000 resolutions have been adopted by the Security Council since 1989.

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